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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom AMBRO, 
FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, VANASKIE, 
and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, join. 
 
This appeal presents a high-stakes dispute over ten 
pieces of gold. Joan Langbord and her sons, Roy and David 
Langbord, claim to be the rightful owners of the gold pieces 
while the Government claims they are property of the United 
States. Following a jury trial, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the 
Government. The Langbords initially prevailed on appeal to 
this Court, but we vacated the panel opinion and agreed to 
 4 
 
hear the case en banc. For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I 
The ten gold pieces at issue—1933 Double Eagles 
with a face value of $20—were designed at the request of 
President Theodore Roosevelt by Augustus Saint-Gaudens 
shortly before the renowned sculptor’s death in 1907. During 
the next twenty-five years, the United States Mint 
manufactured and circulated tens of millions of Double 
Eagles as legal tender. Things changed significantly for the 
Double Eagle during the Great Depression, however. Within 
days of his inauguration on March 4, 1933, President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt signed a series of orders effectively 
prohibiting the Nation’s banks from paying out gold. See 
Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689–91 (Mar. 6, 1933); 
Exec. Order No. 6073 (Mar. 10, 1933). Less than three 
months later, the United States went off the gold standard. 
See Exec. Order No. 6102 (Apr. 5, 1933); H.R.J. Res. 192, 
73d Cong., 48 Stat. 112–13 (June 5, 1933). That same year, 
the United States Mint in Philadelphia struck 445,500 Double 
Eagles, but they were never issued. Instead, all but 500 of the 
1933 Double Eagles were placed into the Mint’s vault in June 
1933. The remaining coins1 were held by the Mint’s Cashier; 
                                                 
1 The parties dispute whether the 1933 Double Eagles 
are “coins.” The Langbords claim they are coins because they 
bear official indicia of their use as instruments of stored 
value; the Government disagrees because they were never 
circulated. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3) (defining 
“monetary instrument” as including “United States coins and 
currency”); Black’s Law Dictionary 326 (4th ed. 1951) 
(defining a coin as “[p]ieces of gold, silver, or other metal, 
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of those, twenty-nine were destroyed in chemical reactions 
used to verify their metallic purity and two were sent to the 
Smithsonian Institution in October 1934.  
By 1937, all of the 1933 Double Eagles held at the 
Philadelphia Mint were supposed to have been melted. This 
turned out not to be the case, however, as some coins were 
transferred among collectors, which prompted the Secret 
Service to begin investigating the matter in March 1944. The 
following year, the Secret Service recovered a small number 
of 1933 Double Eagles and determined that they had been 
stolen from the Mint by George McCann, who was the Mint’s 
Cashier from 1934 to 1940. The Secret Service also 
concluded that the coins had been distributed by a 
Philadelphia merchant, Israel Switt, who was Joan 
Langbord’s father (and grandfather to Roy and David 
Langbord). 
Since 1944, the United States has attempted to locate 
and recover all extant 1933 Double Eagles. See United States 
v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531, 532–33 (W.D. Tenn. 1947) 
(seeking replevin of a 1933 Double Eagle held by a private 
collector). The only exception has been a 1933 Double Eagle 
sold to King Farouk of Egypt in 1944 and later acquired in 
1995 by Stephen Fenton, an English coin dealer. When 
Fenton attempted to resell that coin to a collector in New 
York, the Government seized it and a protracted legal dispute 
                                                                                                             
fashioned into a prescribed shape, weight, and degree of 
fineness, and stamped, by authority of government, with 
certain marks and devices, and put into circulation as money 
at a fixed value”). Without resolving this immaterial dispute, 
we refer to the 1933 Double Eagles as coins for ease of 
reference. 
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ensued. According to the Government, it agreed to resolve its 
dispute with Fenton because the Treasury Department had 
improvidently issued an export license for the coin when it 
was sold to King Farouk in 1944. The “Fenton-Farouk Coin” 
was sold at auction in 2002 to an anonymous buyer for 
$7,590,020 and the net proceeds were divided equally 
between Fenton and the Government pursuant to their 
settlement agreement.  
Just over a year after the Fenton-Farouk Coin was sold 
at auction, Joan Langbord allegedly discovered ten 1933 
Double Eagles in a family safe-deposit box. Her attorney, 
Barry Berke, who had represented Fenton in his dispute with 
the Government, contacted the Mint in an effort to resolve the 
Langbords’ claim in the same way. After meeting with Mint 
officials, the Langbords agreed to turn the coins over for 
authentication but reserved “all rights and remedies.” App. 
806. The Mint took possession of the ten 1933 Double Eagles 
from Roy Langbord on September 22, 2004.  
The Mint authenticated the coins in May 2005, but 
refused to return them to the Langbords. In July 2005, 
attorney Berke asked the Mint to reverse course in light of its 
treatment of other coins of questionable provenance and 
argued that “there [was] no basis for the government to seek 
forfeiture of the . . . 1933 Double Eagles.” App. 911–13. A 
month later, the Mint rejected Berke’s overture, writing: 
The United States Mint has no intention of 
seeking forfeiture of these ten Double Eagles 
because they are, and always have been, 
property belonging to the United States; this 
makes forfeiture proceedings entirely 
unnecessary. These Double Eagles never were 
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lawfully issued but, instead, were taken out of 
the United States Mint at Philadelphia in an 
unlawful manner. Indeed, the Langbord family 
was legally obligated to return this property to 
the United States . . . and will not be able to 
establish based on any reliable or admissible 
evidence how they currently possess, or ever 
possessed, title to this United States 
Government property. 
App. 823.  
Although the Mint had disclaimed any intention of 
forfeiting the coins, the Langbords responded in September 
2005 by sending a “seized asset claim” to the Mint, invoking 
18 U.S.C. § 983, a statute enacted by the Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106-
185, 114 Stat. 202, that contains procedural protections for 
those whose property is subject to forfeiture. The Mint 
returned the claim to the Langbords “without action.” App. 
837. In doing so, the Government argued that no seizure had 
occurred because “all 1933 Double Eagles are, and always 
have been, property belonging to the United States” and that 
the family had “voluntarily surrendered” the coins to the 
Mint. App. 837–38. In a series of missives exchanged in 
December 2005, the Langbords criticized the Mint for 
attempting to “rewrite history and create some kind of record 
a few days before the deadline for the government to either 
return the coins or institute a forfeiture action.” App. 841. The 
Mint responded curtly that the parties had a “fundamental[] 
disagree[ment].” App. 848.  
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II 
Unable to obtain relief through negotiation or 
administrative procedures,2 the Langbords turned to the 
courts. In December 2006, they brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
against the Mint, the Department of the Treasury, and various 
federal officials. The Langbords alleged violations of the 
United States Constitution, CAFRA, and the Administrative 
Procedure Act, as well as common law torts. They also 
sought a declaratory judgment to require the Government to 
comply with CAFRA either by returning the coins or by 
commencing a forfeiture proceeding. The Government filed 
motions to dismiss, but they were denied. The Government 
then filed an answer without asserting any counterclaims. 
A 
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions 
for partial summary judgment and the District Court rendered 
a split decision. See Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
645 F. Supp. 2d 381, 401–02 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
The Langbords prevailed on both of their 
constitutional claims. The District Court first held that the 
Mint committed an unconstitutional seizure when it refused to 
return the coins to the Langbords. Citing Mason v. Pulliam, 
557 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1977), the Court reasoned that the 
Langbords’ Fourth Amendment possessory rights to the ten 
                                                 
2 After the Mint rejected their seized asset claim, the 
Langbords filed an administrative “damages claim” in May 
2006. App. 851–56; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675; 28 C.F.R. 
§ 14.2. The Mint denied that claim as well.  
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Double Eagles were not vitiated by the Government’s claim 
of ownership. Langbord, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 390–92. The 
seizure was unreasonable, the Court held, because the 
Government failed to obtain a warrant and its “superior 
property interest” did not “control the right of the 
Government to search and seize.” Id. at 393–94 (quoting 
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 
(1967)). The District Court also found that the Langbords’ 
Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated. After 
rejecting the Government’s contention that the Mint had not 
seized “property” within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause, the Court evaluated the factors established in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) and 
concluded that the Langbords were entitled to a 
predeprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter. Langbord, 645 
F. Supp. 2d at 394–99. 
Unlike its adjudication of their constitutional claims, 
the District Court rejected the Langbords’ argument that the 
Government violated CAFRA by failing to comply with the 
statute’s notice and claim procedures. In doing so, the Court 
held that CAFRA did not apply because the Mint’s 
repossession of the coins was not tantamount to a nonjudicial 
(i.e., administrative) forfeiture. Id. at 388–90. Despite 
CAFRA’s inapplicability, the District Court nevertheless 
ordered the Government to “initiate a judicial forfeiture 
proceeding concerning the 1933 Double Eagles” as a remedy 
for the Mint’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations, id. at 
402, reasoning: 
Where a court concludes, as we have here, that 
the Government seized property without due 
process and intends to retain the property, we 
must “order the government to either return the 
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[property] to the plaintiffs or to commence 
judicial forfeiture . . . at which time the 
plaintiffs may raise whatever defenses are 
available to them.” 
Id. at 399 (quoting Garcia v. Meza, 235 F.3d 287, 292 (7th 
Cir. 2000)) (citing United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U.S. 
242, 251 (1986); Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States, 458 F.3d 
1327, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006); United States v. Giraldo, 45 
F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1995)). Consequently, the District 
Court required the Government to file a judicial forfeiture 
action in accordance with the dictates of CAFRA. Id.  
B 
Before complying with the District Court’s order to 
initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding, the Government 
sought leave to allege three additional counts: replevin, 
declaratory judgment, and claims against John Does “to 
resolve ripening disputes concerning ownership of other 1933 
Double Eagles,” which “several individuals [are] rumored to 
have, or to have had.” App. 1145–58. The District Court 
denied the Government’s request to seek replevin, noting that 
“a property holder cannot bring a replevin claim seeking the 
return of property it already has.” Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, 749 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
Likewise, the Court denied the Government’s motion with 
respect to the John Doe claims because the events 
surrounding them were not “reasonably related” to the 
original claim as required by Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Id. at 277–78.  
The District Court did, however, permit the 
Government to seek a declaratory judgment that the coins 
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“were not authorized to be taken from the United States Mint 
and that therefore, as a matter of law, all of the 1933 Double 
Eagles remain property belonging to the United States.” App. 
1150; see also Langbord, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 271–72, 274–75 
(treating the claim as a counterclaim). In doing so, the Court 
rejected the Langbords’ contention that the Government’s 
nearly four-year delay in seeking a declaratory judgment was 
“prejudicial,” “undue,” or in “bad faith.” Langbord, 749 F. 
Supp. 2d at 272–76 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 
182 (1962); Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 
2001)). Instead, the District Court found the Government’s 
delay was caused by a “misguided legal strategy,” and that 
the Langbords were not prejudiced because they had 
previously “brought title issues into the mix” by asserting 
claims for replevin and conversion. Id. at 273, 275–76. 
C 
At this stage of the litigation, the positions of the 
parties were as follows. Consistent with the District Court’s 
remedial order, the Government sought forfeiture of the ten 
1933 Double Eagles and a declaration that it owned the coins. 
Meanwhile, the Langbords attempted to fend off the 
Government by arguing, inter alia, that “[f]orfeiture of the 
1933 Double Eagles [was] barred by 18 U.S.C. § 
983(a)(3)(B) because the government failed to file a 
complaint for forfeiture in the time allotted by [CAFRA].” 
App. 1296.   
For two weeks in July 2011 the dispute was tried to a 
jury, which issued a verdict for the Government on its 
forfeiture claim. The Langbords sought judgment as a matter 
of law both at the close of the evidence and following the 
verdict. On August 29, 2012, the District Court denied the 
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Langbords’ post-trial motion and entered judgment for the 
Government on its forfeiture claim. Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of 
the Treasury, 888 F. Supp. 2d 606, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The 
Court also declared: 
The disputed Double Eagles were not lawfully 
removed from the United States Mint and 
accordingly, as a matter of law, they remain the 
property of the United States, regardless of (1) 
the applicability of CAFRA to the disputed 
Double Eagles, (2) Claimants’ state of mind 
with respect to the coins; or (3) how the coins 
came into Claimants’ possession. 
Id. at 633–34. The Langbords filed a timely appeal to this 
Court; the Government did not file a cross-appeal. 
D 
On appeal, the Langbords challenged several orders of 
the District Court, as well as the jury verdict. A panel of this 
Court vacated “all orders at issue on appeal that postdate[d] 
the [District Court’s] July 29, 2009 order, including the jury 
verdict and the . . . order entering judgment.” Langbord v. 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 783 F.3d 441, 445 (3d Cir. 2015). 
In addition, the panel remanded the case to the District Court 
with instructions to “return the [1933] Double Eagles to the 
Langbords.” Id. at 458. Judge Sloviter dissented, opining that 
the coins should not be turned over to the Langbords because 
they belong to the Government. Id. 
The United States filed a timely petition for rehearing 
en banc. In an order dated July 28, 2015, we granted the 
petition and vacated the panel opinion and judgment. Oral 
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arguments were heard on October 14, 2015, and the matter is 
ripe for disposition. 
III 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the 
Langbords’ claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1346, and 1361, 
and 5 U.S.C. § 702. It had jurisdiction over the Government’s 
claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1355. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
IV 
The Langbords’ appellate arguments can be 
summarized as follows: (1) the Government’s forfeiture 
action was time-barred; (2) the District Court should not have 
decided the Government’s declaratory judgment claim; (3) 
the District Court committed reversible errors with respect to 
the evidence; and (4) the jury instructions were erroneous. 
We address each argument in turn.3 
A 
We turn first to the Langbords’ argument that the 
Government’s forfeiture action was time-barred. Under 18 
                                                 
3 At various stages of this litigation, the Government 
has contended that it should not have been required to initiate 
forfeiture proceedings because the ten 1933 Double Eagles 
are, were, and always will be, property of the United States. 
This argument has some logical appeal, but regardless of its 
merits, the propriety of the District Court’s order compelling 
judicial forfeiture is not before us because the Government 
did not appeal it.  
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U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(A), “[a]ny person claiming property 
seized in a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding under a civil 
forfeiture statute may file a claim with the appropriate official 
after the seizure.” Assuming that the claim is timely and 
formally adequate, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 983(a)(2)(B) and (C), the 
statute provides: 
(A) Not later than 90 days after a claim has 
been filed, the Government shall file a 
complaint for forfeiture . . . or return the 
property pending the filing of a complaint, 
except that a court in the district in which the 
complaint will be filed may extend the period 
for filing a complaint for good cause shown or 
upon agreement of the parties. 
(B) If the Government does not . . . file a 
complaint for forfeiture or return the property, 
in accordance with subparagraph (A) . . . the 
Government shall promptly release the property 
pursuant to regulations promulgated by the 
Attorney General, and may not take any further 
action to effect the civil forfeiture of such 
property in connection with the underlying 
offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3). 
Consistent with this statutory scheme, the Langbords’ 
argument is a straightforward syllogism: (1) they filed a 
seized asset claim which started § 983(a)(3)’s ninety-day 
period for the Government to file a forfeiture complaint; (2) 
the Government failed to file a forfeiture action or to obtain 
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an extension of time within ninety days; therefore, (3) the 
Government must return the coins to the Langbords.  
While the logic of this syllogism is valid, it is based on 
a false premise, namely, that the Langbords’ seized asset 
claim triggered CAFRA’s ninety-day deadline. Although 
subsection (a)(2)(A) of § 983 allows a seized asset claim to be 
filed “after the seizure,” it also requires that the claim be 
directed to “property seized in a nonjudicial civil forfeiture 
proceeding.” Id. (emphasis added). This language 
presupposes that a nonjudicial forfeiture4 is pending before a 
                                                 
4 Nonjudicial (or administrative) forfeiture is one of 
three modes of forfeiture established by federal law, the other 
two being judicial forfeitures brought as civil in rem 
proceedings and criminal forfeitures. See generally Stefan D. 
Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States 256 (2d 
ed. 2013) [hereinafter Cassella, Asset Forfeiture]. Nonjudicial 
forfeitures “entail[] no judicial involvement,” United States v. 
McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 669–70 (3d Cir. 2000), and “permit[] 
the United States to determine whether property in its custody 
is unclaimed, and, if it is, to take ownership without the 
trouble and expense of court proceedings,” Small v. United 
States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). CAFRA 
“superimposed” additional rules governing nonjudicial 
forfeitures, see Cassella, Asset Forfeiture 158, but the 
essential scheme has not changed since 1844—after providing 
sufficient notice, an authorized agency may, in the absence of 
a claimant willing to contest the action, issue a “declaration of 
forfeiture . . . [with] the same force and effect as a final 
decree . . . in a judicial forfeiture proceeding in a district court 
of the United States.” 19 U.S.C. § 1609(b); compare United 
States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $2,857.00, 754 F.2d 
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proper seized asset claim can be filed. See also In re Funds on 
Deposit, 919 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172–77 (D. Mass. 2012); 
Chaim v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465–66 (D.N.J. 
2010); United States v. 1866.75 Board Feet of Dipteryx 
Panamensis, 587 F. Supp. 2d 740, 751 (E.D. Va. 2008). A 
contrary interpretation would render the emphasized statutory 
text “mere surplusage, a result we try to avoid,” Direct Mktg. 
Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1132 (2015); see also, e.g., 
Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 
199, 210 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We assume . . . that every word in a 
statute has meaning and avoid interpreting one part of a 
statute in a manner that renders another part superfluous.”). 
Given that property must be seized in a nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding before a seized asset claim triggers the 
Government’s ninety-day period to respond, for the 
Langbords’ argument to succeed, they would have to show 
that the Mint’s retention of the coins initiated a nonjudicial 
forfeiture. As we shall explain, that was not the case. 
Here, the Government determined that it was not 
obliged to initiate forfeiture proceedings against the 1933 
Double Eagles because it had merely repossessed its own 
property. Consistent with this view, neither the Mint nor any 
other federal agency took any steps to initiate a nonjudicial 
forfeiture. In fact, the Government explicitly disclaimed any 
intent to forfeit the coins: “The United States Mint has no 
intention of seeking forfeiture of these ten Double Eagles 
because they are, and always have been, property belonging 
                                                                                                             
208, 211–12 (7th Cir. 1985) (summarizing nonjudicial 
forfeiture pre-CAFRA), with Malladi Drugs & Pharms., Ltd. 
v. Tandy, 552 F.3d 885, 887–88 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same but 
post CAFRA’s enactment). 
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to the United States; this makes forfeiture proceedings 
entirely unnecessary.” App. 823.5 Instead, the Government 
asserted its ownership rights to the coins.  
In reaction to the Government’s assertion of 
ownership, the Langbords incongruously responded with a 
seized asset claim in an attempt to invoke protections 
afforded those whose property is being forfeited—a different 
subject matter. See United States v. A Parcel of Land Known 
as 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 125–26 (1993) 
(plurality opinion) (citing United States v. Grundy, 7 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 337, 350–51 (1806) (“Until the Government does 
                                                 
5 The Langbords claim that the Mint’s letter 
constituted notice that initiated a nonjudicial forfeiture. We 
disagree because, although CAFRA does not specify the 
content of nonjudicial forfeiture notices, a letter that explicitly 
disavows any intent to initiate a forfeiture surely cannot 
suffice.  
Nor do we agree with the Langbords that the 
Government “intended to achieve a nonjudicial forfeiture” 
because federal agencies besides the Mint thought pursuing 
forfeiture would be a prudent course of action, or because 
“subsequent communications to the Langbords made clear the 
government was retaining the Coins with the intent of 
permanently divesting the Langbords of their property 
without providing compensation or going to court.” Langbord 
Br. 28–29. With respect to the former, it is true that most of 
the agencies involved recommended forfeiture, but it was the 
Mint’s view that ultimately prevailed. And with respect to the 
latter, that argument is based on the erroneous premise that 
the Government’s seizure of the 1933 Double Eagles sufficed 
to commence a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding. 
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win . . . a judgment [of forfeiture], however, someone else 
owns the property.”)); id. at 134 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“What the United States already owns cannot be forfeited to 
it.”). While forfeiture is a process by which “[t]itle is 
instantaneously transferred to another,” Black’s Law 
Dictionary 722 (9th ed. 2009), an assertion of ownership 
presupposes that the party already has title. Thus, the 
Langbords’ seized asset claim was akin to filing a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of someone not in custody—
mismatched and ineffective.  
The Langbords counter that regardless of the agency’s 
intentions and conduct, the Government nonetheless initiated 
a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding when it seized the 
1933 Double Eagles. We disagree for two reasons. 
First, seizures and forfeitures are not the same. A 
“seizure” is “[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of . . 
. property by legal right or process.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
1480 (9th ed. 2009). “Forfeiture,” as previously noted, 
involves a transfer of title from one party to another. Id. at 
722. As these definitions indicate, the essential difference 
between a “seizure” and a “forfeiture” is that in the former, 
the government obtains possession while in the latter it 
obtains title (i.e., ownership). Government actors regularly 
seize property with the intention of returning it to the person 
from whom it was seized. See, e.g., United States v. 
Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 375–76 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well 
settled that the government is permitted to seize evidence for 
use in investigation and trial, but that such property must be 
returned once criminal proceedings have concluded, unless it 
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is contraband or subject to forfeiture.”).6 It follows that a 
seizure alone does not initiate a forfeiture proceeding because 
it does not implicate a transfer of legal title. See 92 Buena 
Vista, 507 U.S. at 125 (“It has been proved that in all 
forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing vests in the 
government until some legal step shall be taken for the 
assertion of its right . . . .” (emphasis added) (quoting Grundy, 
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 350–51)); cf. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 
135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015) (regulation vesting title to 
“reserve raisins” in the government constituted a “physical” 
taking under the Fifth Amendment even though “[r]eserve 
raisins are sometimes left on the premises of [private] 
handlers,” who hold them “for the account of the 
[g]overnment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
                                                 
6 To be sure, seizure of a putative res “has long been 
considered a prerequisite to the initiation of in rem forfeiture 
proceedings.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57 (1993) (citing Republic Nat’l Bank of 
Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 84 (1992); The Brig 
Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 291 (1815)). But that fact 
implicitly recognizes the distinction between seizure and 
forfeiture, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in James Daniel 
Good—permitting the Government to pursue forfeiture of real 
property in the absence of seizure—only reinforces the point. 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 985(b)(1)(A) (stating the general rule 
that “real property that is the subject of a civil forfeiture 
action shall not be seized before entry of an order of 
forfeiture”). 
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Second, we have impliedly rejected the Langbords’ 
argument twice before. See Mantilla v. United States, 302 
F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. $8,221,877.16 in 
U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). In Mantilla, we 
considered a putatively time-barred forfeiture of money 
seized by the Customs Service during an undercover drug 
sting. See 302 F.3d at 184 (case proceeding under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1621). We observed that Customs failed to institute a 
nonjudicial forfeiture within the five-year statute of 
limitations and simply “deposited the funds into its 
undercover operation account.” Id. Almost eight years after 
the seizure, the claimant filed an action to recover the seized 
funds raising an issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2401. Under this 
statute, the claimant had a six-year statute of limitations 
running from when the “right of action first accrues” to file 
his suit against the government to claim his property. Id. at 
184. In deciding whether the claimant’s action was timely, we 
held that the six-year period under § 2401 started “at the close 
of forfeiture proceedings,” or “if no forfeiture proceedings 
were conducted, at the end of the five-year limitations period 
during which the government is permitted to bring a forfeiture 
action.” Id. at 186 (quoting Polanco v. DEA, 158 F.3d 647, 
654 (2d Cir. 1998)). This holding effectively applied an 
eleven-year limitations period starting from the date of 
seizure to hold the claimant’s cause of action timely. See id. 
Had the government’s seizure of the drug money commenced 
a “de facto” forfeiture, a six-year period would have applied.    
One year after Mantilla we applied the same principle 
against the government.  In $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 
we rejected the government’s argument that it commenced a 
forfeiture proceeding within the applicable statute of 
limitations simply by seizing funds it believed to be the 
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proceeds of drug trafficking. 330 F.3d at 157–61. In that case, 
the government sought forfeiture of the defendant funds 
under 18 U.S.C. § 984, which permits the United States to 
pursue the forfeiture of “fungible property” (such as money) 
without tracing the property to particular unlawful 
transactions. 330 F.3d at 158–59. This type of forfeiture 
comes with a caveat: a “forfeiture action in rem” under § 984 
must be “commenced” within one year of the offense “that is 
the basis for the forfeiture.” Id. at 158 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
984 (2000)). The government argued that its seizure of the 
funds was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, but we 
disagreed, holding the “commencement” of a forfeiture action 
under § 984 requires the filing of a judicial forfeiture 
complaint. Id. at 159–60.  
We acknowledge that Mantilla and $8,211,877 were 
not decided under CAFRA and do not squarely answer the 
question of when a “nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding” 
begins under the statute.7 Nevertheless, these decisions 
plainly recognized—contrary to the Langbords’ contention 
here—that a seizure is neither the same as a forfeiture nor 
does it automatically trigger forfeiture proceedings. See also 
Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 163 (2002) 
(observing that the FBI started the nonjudicial forfeiture 
process more than two years after the property was seized); 
Taylor v. United States, 483 F.3d 385, 386–87, 389 (5th Cir. 
2007) (citing Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.2d 
657, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the DEA began 
                                                 
7 CAFRA applies only to forfeitures commenced on or 
after August 23, 2000. United States v. One “Piper” Aztec, 
321 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings a month after the property 
was seized and chronicling the agency’s various forms of 
notice it provided that such a proceeding had been initiated)); 
United States v. Miscellaneous Firearms, 376 F.3d 709, 711–
12 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that the ATF commenced a 
nonjudicial forfeiture by sending a letter to the defendant 
notifying him of his rights forty-four days after the property 
was seized); United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 765–
66 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the publication of notice of 
intent to forfeit starts the nonjudicial forfeiture process); 
Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301, 304–05 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); 
United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the FBI’s methods of notifying the defendant of 
its intent to forfeit money it had previously seized); Floyd v. 
United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting 
that forfeiture proceedings did not begin until notice was 
given despite a seizure taking place at an earlier date); United 
States v. U.S. Currency in the Amount of $2,857.00, 754 F.2d 
208, 211–12 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that forfeitures begin 
with the publication of notice after seizure).8 
For the reasons stated, we reject the Langbords’ 
premise that the Government initiated a “nonjudicial civil 
forfeiture proceeding” subject to CAFRA’s ninety-day 
deadline. Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it 
ordered the Government to pursue a judicial forfeiture of the 
                                                 
8 The Government invites us to hold that nonjudicial 
forfeitures under CAFRA commence when it sends notice of 
its intent to forfeit the property. We need not reach this issue 
because the Government took no steps to forfeit the 1933 
Double Eagles. 
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1933 Double Eagles to remedy the Government’s 
constitutional violations. 9 
B 
We next consider the Langbords’ three challenges to 
the District Court’s declaratory judgment. First, they claim 
that CAFRA is a special statutory proceeding that prohibits 
the Government from seeking a declaratory judgment. 
Second, they argue that if a declaratory judgment action were 
                                                 
9 Our dissenting colleagues claim that our decision will 
“allow the Government to nullify CAFRA’s provisions at 
will” on its “say-so that it owns” the disputed property. 
Dissent Op. 1. Not so. “CAFRA’s purpose is ‘[t]o provide a 
more just and uniform procedure for Federal civil 
forfeitures.’” Dissent Op. 5 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
CAFRA applies when the government invokes its forfeiture 
power. Permitting the government to pursue its ownership 
rights does not eviscerate CAFRA’s procedural protections 
for persons whose property is subject to forfeiture because the 
rules governing both are different. Cf. United States v. Craig, 
694 F.3d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing criminal 
restitution from forfeiture). Those who dispute the 
government’s claim of ownership have recourse to common 
law remedies, such as replevin, which were available long 
before CAFRA was enacted and which CAFRA did nothing 
to displace. In this case, the Government made no efforts to 
institute a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding, going so far as to 
explicitly disclaim the intent to do so. Under these 
circumstances, the Government failed to trigger CAFRA's 
procedures not by its “say-so,” but by its conduct. 
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appropriate, it had to be submitted to a jury. Finally, they 
contend it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to 
allow the Government to seek a declaratory judgment nearly 
four years after the litigation began.  
1 
The Langbords argue that CAFRA constitutes a special 
statutory proceeding that precludes the entry of a declaratory 
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 advisory committee’s note 
to 1937 amendment (“A declaration may not be rendered if a 
special statutory proceeding has been provided for the 
adjudication of some special type of case . . . .”). We need not 
decide this question of first impression, however, because 
even if CAFRA were a special statutory proceeding, our 
conclusion would be the same: the Government’s declaratory 
judgment action was permissible.  
The problem for the Langbords is that if CAFRA were 
a special statutory proceeding, it would only preclude 
declaratory judgments that affect forfeiture. In this case, the 
Government did not seek a declaratory judgment in lieu of 
forfeiture; it did so in an attempt to quiet title to the Double 
Eagles in addition to the court-ordered judicial forfeiture 
proceeding. While the declaratory judgment action did turn 
on a similar factual predicate as the forfeiture claim (i.e., that 
the coins were stolen or embezzled), it used this fact to 
establish an independent legal theory, namely, that the 
Government was attempting to regain possession of what it 
believed to be its own property. As the District Court 
persuasively reasoned:  
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[A]lthough CAFRA could be considered the 
prosecutor’s remedy, the forfeiture proceeding 
only resolves one of the two open questions in 
this case: were the Double Eagles stolen from 
the Mint and/or possessed by individuals who 
knew they were stolen, rendering them 
forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. § 641? If the United 
States does not meet its burden on the forfeiture 
count, whether the Langbords are the legal 
owners of the Double Eagles remains 
unanswered because a second question—did the 
Langbords ever obtain legal title to the Double 
Eagles by virtue of their leaving the Mint 
through authorized channels?—would remain. 
The declaratory judgment count provides a 
mechanism for determining the answer to the 
second inquiry, relevant because of the United 
States’ second role as previous lawful owners—
and according to the United States, perpetually 
lawful owners—of the Double Eagles. 
Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 798 F. Supp. 2d 607, 
610 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
In sum, because such a theory does not implicate 
forfeiture, it could not be precluded by any special procedures 
of CAFRA. To hold otherwise would prevent the Government 
from seeking a declaratory judgment in its capacity as a 
property owner, which would have the untenable effect of 
putting the United States in a worse position than a civilian 
property owner—a position at odds with longstanding 
precedent. Cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 
(1947) (“[O]fficers who have no authority at all to dispose of 
Government property cannot by their conduct cause the 
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Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, 
laches, or failure to act.”); United States v. Steinmetz, 973 
F.2d 212, 222–23 (3d Cir. 1992).  
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in 
allowing the Government to seek a declaratory judgment that 
the coins are the property of the United States. 
2 
The Langbords also contend that once the 
Government’s declaratory judgment action was allowed to 
proceed, it should have been submitted to the jury. To answer 
this question, we ask whether the declaratory judgment action 
fits within the pattern of cases typically decided by a court 
sitting in equity or whether the case presents an “inverted law 
suit” brought by one who would have been a defendant at 
common law, which would be for the jury to decide. See 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 
1189 (3d Cir. 1979). In adjudicating this question, “federal 
not state law is determinative.” Id. (citing Simler v. Conner, 
372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (per curiam)). 
 We perceive no error in the District Court’s 
conclusion that the Government’s declaratory judgment claim 
fits the equitable pattern of an action to quiet title. As the 
District Court found: “Here, the Government possesses the 
coins and claims rightful ownership, but the Langbords’ 
assertion that the Double Eagles legally belonged to Israel 
Switt and were legally inherited by the Langbord Claimants 
clouds the Government’s title.” Langbord, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 
611. We agree that such a claim is analogous to a claim to 
quiet title. See 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1250 (3d ed. 2016) 
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(describing quiet title, traditionally, as an action brought by a 
plaintiff who alleges both ownership and possession of 
property for which she seeks to uncloud title).  
The Langbords challenge this conclusion, arguing that 
Pennsylvania law does not provide for an action to quiet title 
to personal property. In their view, the absence of a 
Pennsylvania counterpart to a suit in equity means that the 
Government’s declaratory judgment is more akin to an action 
in replevin—a cause of action resolved by juries. We 
disagree, principally because the Langbords’ reliance on 
Pennsylvania law is misplaced. Determining whether a 
declaratory judgment action is tried before a jury is a question 
of federal, not state law. Owens-Illinois, 610 F.2d at 1189; see 
also Simler, 372 U.S. at 222 (“[T]he right to a jury trial in the 
federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal law in 
diversity as well as other actions.”). Thus, we look to whether 
the “basic character” of the suit sounds in equity under 
federal law. See Simler, 372 U.S. at 222–23; Owens-Illinois, 
Inc., 610 F.2d at 1189. And here it clearly does—fitting the 
pattern of a quiet title action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a); 28 
U.S.C. § 1655; cf. Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 933 F.2d 
1131, 1135–36 (2d Cir. 1991) (deciding a quiet title action for 
personal property without submitting the case to a jury). 
The Langbords next argue that the Government’s 
declaratory judgment claim should have been submitted to the 
jury because, had the Government not unconstitutionally 
seized the coins, it would have been forced to try a replevin 
action to a jury. We decline the Langbords’ invitation to 
engage in a hypothetical analysis. In this case, the District 
Court remedied the Government’s impermissible seizure of 
the coins by ordering a forfeiture action to be filed and did 
not require that the coins be returned to the Langbords. The 
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Langbords essentially ask us to supplement this remedy by 
asserting that we should determine whether the Government’s 
declaratory judgment should have gone to a jury based on the 
premise that the Langbords retained possession of the coins. 
And they do so without citing precedent or explaining why 
the remedy given by the District Court should be displaced on 
appeal. Even if we were to find merit in the Langbords’ 
contention, it does not follow that had the Government not 
seized the coins, it would have been forced to bring a replevin 
action. The Government would have had other options. For 
example, it could have authenticated the coins, returned them 
to the Langbords, and then seized the coins pursuant to a 
warrant before bringing an action to quiet title. In sum, we see 
no good reason to supplement the District Court’s remedy and 
we reject the Langbords’ implicit claim that the 
unconstitutional seizure was the “but for” cause of the 
absence of a jury trial.  
Lodging one final attack on the Court’s decision not to 
submit the declaratory judgment to the jury, the Langbords 
contend that they reserved the right to a jury trial when they 
relinquished the coins to the Mint for authentication with the 
proviso that they “reserved all rights.” Whatever rights the 
Langbords reserved, it would be passing strange for us to 
conclude that the right to be sued in replevin was one of them. 
Because the Government was under no obligation to file any 
action in replevin and had other means to attempt to prove 
title to the coins, the Langbords were not entitled to a jury 
trial on the Government’s declaratory judgment claim. 
3 
The Langbords’ final challenge to the District Court’s 
declaratory judgment is that the Government forfeited the 
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claim by failing to add it to its counterclaim in a timely 
manner. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the 
liberal amendment of pleadings and the decision whether 
such leave should be granted is “committed to the ‘sound 
discretion of the district court.’” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 629 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Cureton, 252 F.3d at 272). As such, we review a district 
court’s determination only for abuse of discretion. Id.   
“A district court may deny leave to amend . . . if a 
plaintiff’s delay in seeking amendment is undue, motivated 
by bad faith, or prejudicial to the opposing party.” Cureton, 
252 F.3d at 272–73. The mere passage of time “is an 
insufficient ground to deny leave to amend.” Id. Nevertheless, 
“at some point, the delay will become ‘undue,’ placing an 
unwarranted burden on the court, or will become 
‘prejudicial,’ placing an unfair burden on the opposing party.” 
Id. at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Adams 
v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)).  In 
furtherance of this analysis, courts “focus on the movant’s 
reasons for not amending sooner.” Id. 
Here, the Langbords contend the District Court abused 
its discretion by allowing the Government to add its 
declaratory judgment claim after the case had been 
progressing for nearly four years. In their view, the request to 
amend should have been denied because the Government had 
no good reason not to amend sooner.  
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 
District Court committed no error when it allowed the 
Government to amend its counterclaim. Agreeing with the 
Langbords’ arguments in many respects, the District Court 
found that the Government’s delay “though significant, was 
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not undue.” Langbord, 749 F. Supp. 2d at 275. In particular, 
the District Court noted that the Government did not have a 
good reason for its delay because its proffered excuse seemed 
like a “strategic choice.” Id. The Court then proceeded to 
consider all the other factors that inform the “undue delay” 
analysis. Specifically, the Court found that the claim for 
declaratory judgment “neither introduce[d] new factual issues 
nor revive[d] irrelevant disputes.” Id. at 273, 275. Rather, it 
involved matters the Langbords themselves had put at issue in 
their complaint––claims that were still unresolved at the time 
the Government sought leave to amend. Id. Thus, the Court 
found the amendment would put the Langbords in “no worse 
a position had the Government brought th[e] counterclaim” 
along with its initial answer. Id. And for that reason, the 
Court concluded the amendment would neither prejudice the 
Langbords, nor place an unwarranted burden on the Court. Id. 
In so finding, the Court concluded that the Government’s 
amendment presented no undue delay. Id. at 275. As we have 
noted in previous cases, the District Court here “‘had 
considerable familiarity with the development of the factual 
and legal issues’ and ‘carefully analyzed the [defendant’s] 
proffered reasons for delay, the prejudice to [the plaintiffs], 
and the substance of the amended complaint.’” CMR D.N., 
703 F.3d at 631 (quoting Cureton, 252 F.2d at 274). We see 
no reversible error in its discretionary decision. 
C 
The Langbords next claim they are entitled to a new 
trial because the District Court committed various evidentiary 
errors. They contend: (1) Secret Service reports were 
erroneously admitted; (2) documents related to United States 
v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Tenn. 1947), should have 
been excluded; (3) evidence related to Israel Switt’s prior 
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arrest and forfeiture of gold should not have been admitted; 
and (4) certain testimony of the Government’s expert witness, 
David Tripp, should have been excluded. We find no error in 
admitting the evidence related to Barnard and Switt’s prior 
forfeiture, but we agree with the Langbords that portions of 
both the Secret Service reports and Tripp’s testimony should 
have been excluded. After examining the entire record of the 
case, however, we hold that those evidentiary errors were 
harmless. 
1 
We begin by examining the admission of a number of 
Secret Service reports dating back to the 1930s and 1940s. 
These documents were admitted under the “ancient 
documents” exception to the hearsay rule, which provides that 
“[a] statement in a document that is at least 20 years old and 
whose authenticity is established” is “not excluded by the rule 
against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is 
available as a witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(16); see also Fed. 
R. Evid. 901 (providing rules governing the authentication of 
ancient documents). The Langbords argue that the District 
Court erred in admitting these documents because they 
contained hearsay within hearsay and the Court did not 
require them to satisfy the multiple-hearsay rule, Fed. R. 
Evid. 805 (“Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the 
rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements 
conforms with an exception to the rule.”).  
  As the District Court observed, courts have disagreed 
about whether the multiple-hearsay rule applies to statements 
made in ancient documents. Compare United States v. Hajda, 
135 F.3d 439, 443–44 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[If] the [ancient] 
document contains more than one level of hearsay, an 
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appropriate exception must be found for each level.”); Hicks 
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 799, 805–07 (E.D. 
Tex. 2005) (“Even if a document qualifies as ancient under 
Rule 803(16), other hearsay exceptions must be used to 
render each individual layer of hearsay admissible.”); United 
States v. Stelmokas, 1995 WL 464264, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 
1995), with Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 2011 WL 
2623315, at *16 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011) (citing Murray v. 
Sevier, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1999), 
vacated on other grounds by Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d 1308 
(11th Cir. 2001); Gonzales v. N. Twp. of Lake Cty., 800 F. 
Supp. 676, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 4 
F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993); Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. 
Supp. 1274, 1280 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 1984); 2 John W. Strong et 
al., McCormick on Evidence § 323 (5th ed. 2003)). See 
generally Gregg Kettles, Ancient Documents and the Rule 
Against Multiple Hearsay, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 719, 752–
60 & nn.161–63 (1999). In our view, stronger precedent 
supports the application of Rule 805 to ancient documents.  
We are particularly persuaded by the analysis of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in United States v. Stelmokas. In that case, 
Judge DuBois held that ancient documents were subject to 
Rule 805 because “hearsay statements contained within an 
ancient document lack the same indicia of trustworthiness and 
reliability that provide the rationale for admitting statements 
when the declarant is the author of the ancient document.” 
1995 WL 464264, at *6. The court noted that the exception 
“is based on a rationale that authenticated ancient documents 
bear certain indicia of trustworthiness,” namely: (1) a lack of 
motive to fabricate due to the document’s age; (2) the writing 
requirement “minimizes the danger of mistransmission”; and 
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(3) “the document is more likely to be accurate than the oral 
testimony of the declarant based on his memory of events of 
twenty or more years ago.” Id. at *5 (citing 2 John W. Strong 
et al., McCormick on Evidence § 322 (4th ed. 1992); Charles 
E. Wagner, Federal Rules of Evidence Commentary 452 
(1993); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 803(16)(1) (1994)). While these 
indicia of trustworthiness justified admitting the ancient 
document as such, they did not justify admitting hearsay 
statements contained therein: 
[T]here is no guarantee that a hearsay statement 
contained in the [ancient document] is accurate. 
The author of the ancient document may have 
misheard or misunderstood the hearsay 
statement or his written words may not convey 
the meaning intended by the hearsay declarant. 
These issues of perception and narration are not 
merely peripheral but are fundamental problems 
of hearsay evidence. 
Id. at *6; see also Daniel J. Capra, Electronically Stored 
Information and the Ancient Documents Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule: Fix It Before People Find Out About It, 17 
Yale J.L. & Tech. 1, 9 n.32 (2015) (“[T]he ancient documents 
exception does not abrogate the rule on multiple hearsay 
imposed by Rule 805—at least in the view of right-thinking 
courts.”).10  
                                                 
10 Since 1996, Professor Capra has been the Reporter 
for the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. The Rules Committee recently 
proposed to eliminate the ancient documents exception to the 
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The District Court and the Government rely principally 
on treatises that disagree with the multiple-hearsay rule’s 
application out of fear that requiring a separate exception for 
each level of hearsay would eviscerate the ancient documents 
exception. See Langbord, 2011 WL 2623315, at *16–17; 
Gov’t Br. 40–41; see also 30C Michael H. Graham, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 7057 n.1 (2014) (stating that 
requiring establishment of a different hearsay exception for 
the embedded hearsay statements “would effectively 
emasculate Rule 803(16)’s utility as it did in Hicks”). 
Alternatively, the District Court reasoned that the multiple-
hearsay rule was satisfied because “Rule 803(16) supplies the 
grounds by which each level within an ancient document 
becomes admissible.” Langbord, 2011 WL 2623315, at *17. 
We are unpersuaded, largely because the rationale justifying 
the ancient documents exception does not apply to the 
admission of hearsay statements embedded within the 
documents. Stelmokas, 1995 WL 464264, at *5–6. 
We therefore hold that the District Court abused its 
discretion by admitting the hearsay embedded within Secret 
                                                                                                             
rule against hearsay in a draft Committee Note published on 
August 14, 2015. See Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (Aug. 14, 2015), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18375/download. The draft 
Committee Note bluntly asserts that “[t]he exception was 
based on the flawed premise that the contents of a document 
are reliable merely because the document is old” and the rule 
“could have once been thought tolerable out of necessity.” Id. 
at 25–26. 
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Service reports into evidence without applying Rule 805. In 
so holding, we emphasize that this error does not render the 
Secret Service reports inadmissible in toto. Rather, first-level 
hearsay remains admissible as Rule 805 does not apply to 
those statements and their use is permitted by Rule 803(16) 
(the ancient documents exception). 
2 
The Langbords’ second evidentiary objection concerns 
the introduction of the opinion and findings of fact from 
United States v. Barnard, 72 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Tenn. 
1947). In Barnard, the United States filed a replevin action 
against a coin collector to recover a 1933 Double Eagle and 
the judge found that the coin at issue had not left the 
Philadelphia Mint legally. 72 F. Supp. at 532. On initial 
review of the Barnard documents in the Langbords’ case, the 
District Court found them admissible under the ancient 
documents exception to the hearsay rule. Langbord, 2011 WL 
2623315, at *5. But after examining them under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403, the Court found the documents admissible 
only for two purposes: to demonstrate that Israel Switt had 
notice that the coins were stolen and to help the jury evaluate 
expert David Tripp’s testimony under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 703. Id. at *5–6.  
On appeal, the Langbords insist that the Barnard 
documents should have been excluded for four reasons. Their 
first objection—that the documents were hearsay—is a 
nonstarter for the obvious reason that they were not offered to 
prove the truth of their contents. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2).  
Second, the Langbords claim that the Barnard 
documents, even if not hearsay, should have been excluded 
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because they were irrelevant. In their view, the Government 
was unable to prove Switt was aware of the Barnard opinion 
because it could not show that he read either the opinion, 
news articles discussing the opinion, or an article about the 
case in The Numismatist (a journal for coin dealers). As such, 
the Barnard opinion could not have put Switt on notice that 
holding the 1933 Double Eagles was illegal. As we shall 
explain, these arguments do not satisfy the high bar for 
establishing irrelevance.  
Evidence is relevant so long as it has “any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.” United States v. 
Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Fed. R. 
Evid. 401). “When the relevance of evidence depends on 
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the fact does exist.” Fed. R. Evid. 
104(b). To determine whether the Government has met this 
burden, “[t]he court simply examines all the evidence in the 
case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the 
conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).  
In light of all the evidence, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by determining that a jury could 
reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that Switt 
was aware of the Barnard documents. This is true for several 
reasons. First, the Government presented evidence that Switt 
was in the business of dealing coins and had dealt in 1933 
Double Eagles. Second, Switt was questioned by the Secret 
Service and had been tied to the coin at issue in Barnard. 
Finally, the case made national news and was discussed in 
The Numismatist.  
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The Langbords argue alternatively that the Barnard 
documents should have been excluded under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 because their probative value was outweighed 
by their prejudicial impact. According to the Langbords, the 
documents lacked probative value because, if not taken for 
their truth, they could show only that the Government 
believed that the coins were stolen and sought to recover 
them. In other words, the Government’s belief that the coins 
were stolen could not provide Switt with knowledge that they 
were, in fact, stolen. Thus, they were minimally probative of 
Switt’s notice that he could not lawfully possess the coins.  
The Langbords have not satisfied the exacting standard 
of Rule 403. We may overturn a district court’s decision 
under this rule only if “it is ‘arbitrary and irrational.’” Bhaya 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 
1990) (quoting United States v. DePeri, 778 F.2d 963, 973–
74 (3d Cir. 1985)). Even if we were to credit the Langbords’ 
distinction between “Switt’s knowledge” and the 
“Government’s belief,” the Barnard documents are 
nonetheless probative of Switt’s knowledge because they 
provided some notice of the dubiousness of one’s right to 
possess a 1933 Double Eagle because the United States had 
actively sought their return as stolen government property. 
And this probative value was not substantially outweighed by 
the risk of unfair prejudice, especially in light of the fact that 
the District Court instructed the jury as to how the Barnard 
evidence could be used.  
Finally, the Langbords claim the District Court abused 
its discretion by admitting the Barnard documents under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 because the Government’s 
expert, David Tripp, neither explicitly mentioned Barnard as 
evidence underlying his opinion nor referred to it in 
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explaining his conclusions. In fact, Tripp did refer to Barnard 
while summarizing his opinion and the material underlying 
that opinion.11 And Tripp’s testimony and its context 
demonstrate that he used Barnard as a basis for his opinion. 
Because this is precisely what Rule 703 anticipates, we find 
no abuse of discretion.12  
                                                 
11 Immediately after Tripp mentioned Barnard, the 
Langbords asked for an instruction on the use of the opinion. 
The Court obliged and explained the purpose of the Barnard 
evidence.  
12 The Langbords lodge one more challenge against the 
Barnard documents, arguing that even if they were 
admissible, the Government improperly invoked them in a 
manner that invited the jury to consider them for their truth. 
This allegedly occurred on five occasions: twice by Tripp, 
who referred to the case as showing that the Langbord coins 
were illegally taken from the Mint instead of the Barnard 
coin, and on three other occasions during the Government’s 
closing argument.  
In regard to the two Tripp statements, neither commit 
the mistake alleged by the Langbords. When read in context, 
both statements discuss the Barnard opinion alone and do not 
assert that the decision is determinative of the propriety of the 
Langbords’ claim to the Double Eagles at issue here. Further 
tempering any such concerns, the District Court described the 
role of expert witnesses and explained that the Barnard 
evidence adverted to by Tripp could be used only to evaluate 
the basis upon which he grounded his opinion and was not 
determinative of the Langbords’ case. This limiting 
instruction helped ensure that the jury understood the proper 
purpose of Tripp’s use of the Barnard evidence.  
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For all the reasons stated, we hold the District Court 
did not err in admitting the Barnard documents. 
3 
Next, the Langbords contend that evidence that Israel 
Switt forfeited 98 gold coins that he possessed in 
contravention of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 should have 
been excluded. The Government sought to introduce 
documents from this forfeiture to prove that Switt was aware 
of the repercussions of holding coins illegally and that he was 
motivated to conceal 1933 Double Eagles.  
The Langbords argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion by admitting this evidence for three reasons: (1) it 
was improper character evidence used to show Switt had a 
propensity to unlawfully hoard coins; (2) it was not relevant 
as the prior forfeiture took place under the Gold Reserve Act 
while this forfeiture was brought under CAFRA; and (3) even 
if the past forfeiture was relevant, its probative value was 
outweighed by its unfair prejudice.  
                                                                                                             
 As for the Government’s alleged misuse of the 
evidence during closing arguments, the Langbords did not 
object to the Government’s three references to the Barnard 
documents in its closing. We find no plain error because the 
Langbords’ substantial rights were not affected and the 
comments did not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Han Tak Lee v. 
Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 
Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 197 (3d Cir. 2007)). These three 
brief comments were made before the District Court cured 
any possible confusion by explaining in a detailed manner to 
what extent the Barnard documents could be considered.  
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Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the use of 
information regarding an individual’s prior bad acts as 
evidence that the person has the propensity to act in such a 
manner. Of course, prior bad acts may be admitted for 
purposes other than propensity. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The 
Government contends that evidence of Switt’s prior forfeiture 
of 98 gold coins demonstrated his knowledge that it forfeits 
illegally held coins and provided a motive to conceal 1933 
Double Eagles to avoid this fate. We agree. Accordingly, 
these two uses of the evidence from Switt’s prior forfeiture do 
not go to his propensity and therefore were not excludable 
under Rule 404(b). 
With proper purposes identified, the Government must 
then demonstrate that the evidence it seeks to introduce is 
relevant for those purposes—meaning that it had “any 
tendency” to make a consequential fact “more or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence,” Fed. R. 
Evid. 401; see also, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 
267, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2014). The Langbords insist the 
Government failed to do so because the forfeiture Switt 
suffered was effectuated under the Gold Reserve Act while 
this forfeiture proceeded under CAFRA. They also emphasize 
that the Gold Reserve Act allowed the Government to forfeit 
coins possessed in contravention of the Act, while CAFRA 
permits the forfeiture of stolen goods. Thus, having coins 
forfeited for possessing them against the dictates of the Gold 
Reserve Act is not probative of either notice to Switt that the 
Government also forfeits stolen coins or Switt’s motivation to 
conceal the coins to avoid this type of forfeiture. We disagree. 
While Switt’s prior forfeiture and the one at issue here 
do arise from different legal bases, the fact that Switt had 
previously forfeited gold coins to the Government is relevant 
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to his knowledge that holding gold coins may be unlawful 
under certain circumstances. His prior loss of gold coins 
through a forfeiture proceeding also made it more likely that 
Switt would conceal any other coins he possessed for fear of 
losing them as well.  
Nor was this evidence excludable under Rule 403 
balancing. In support of their contention that the evidence’s 
unfair prejudice exceeded its probative value, the Langbords 
point to various instances where the evidence was used at 
trial. Langbord Br. 58–60. In particular, they direct us to the 
facts that the Government: (1) mentioned Switt’s prior arrest 
on too many occasions; (2) stated Switt was “known to the 
Secret Service,” “knew how to deal with law enforcement,” 
“was angry with the Government,” wanted to “thumb his nose 
at the Government,” and failed to relinquish his gold coins in 
the manner “all other citizens did;” and (3) elicited expert 
testimony on two occasions that Switt failed to carry out his 
patriotic duty by not turning the coins over to the 
Government. Langbord Br. 58–59. According to the 
Langbords, these uses demonstrate the prejudice posed by the 
evidence and it should have been excluded outright. 
While posing some prejudice to the Langbords, we 
cannot conclude that the District Court’s determination that 
such prejudice failed to outweigh the evidence’s probative 
value was “arbitrary and irrational.” Bhaya, 922 F.2d at 187 
(quoting DePeri, 778 F.2d at 973–74). In deciding to admit 
the evidence over the Langbords’ objection, the District Court 
carefully weighed its probative value and possible prejudicial 
impact. The Court found the fact that the evidence spoke to 
Switt’s knowledge and motivation at the time in which the 
Double Eagles were allegedly concealed particularly 
probative as to whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 
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occurred. Langbord, 2011 WL 2623315, at *5–6. With that 
said, the Court acknowledged that some prejudice would 
inure, but determined that the balance tipped in favor of 
admitting the evidence. Id. at *8. This quintessential 
judgment call by the District Court was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
4 
For their final evidentiary objection, the Langbords 
assert that the Government’s expert, David Tripp, transmitted 
inadmissible hearsay to the jury without drawing upon any 
specialized knowledge and that this hearsay’s probative value 
did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect. Langbord 
Br. 60–62 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703; United States v. 
Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008)). Specifically, the 
Langbords cite Tripp’s statements regarding Barnard, his 
testimony about Switt’s prior forfeiture, and his summaries of 
the Secret Service reports we discussed previously. 
We turn first to the Langbords’ argument that Tripp’s 
testimony was not supported by specialized knowledge. We 
have interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to impose a 
“trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, 
reliability and fit.” Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v. 
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). The third of these 
requirements, “fit,” is at issue here. In order to satisfy that 
requirement of Rule 702, an “expert’s testimony must be 
relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier 
of fact.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (stating as a 
condition for admitting an expert’s testimony that “the 
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue”); United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 
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215, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2007). To the Langbords, Tripp was a 
mere conduit for transmitting inadmissible hearsay to the jury 
by reading documents to them. We disagree.  
As a historian, the tools of Tripp’s trade include old 
documents regarding past events such as the Barnard opinion, 
accounts of Switt’s prior forfeiture, and the Secret Service 
reports. To fulfill his role as an expert witness, Tripp was 
obliged to help the jury understand the historical background 
of the 1933 Double Eagles. He did so by “‘surveying a 
daunting amount of historical sources,’ evaluating their 
reliability and providing a basis for ‘a reliable narrative about 
that past.’” United States v. Kantengwa, 781 F.3d 545, 562 
(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Alvaro Hasani, Putting History on 
the Stand: A Closer Look at the Legitimacy of Criticisms 
Levied Against Historians Who Testify as Expert Witnesses, 
34 Whittier L. Rev. 343, 354–55 (2013)). And while the 
Langbords are correct that Tripp read portions of his source 
material verbatim to the jury, the excerpts he chose from 
voluminous historical materials provided context and 
explained past events. See id.; Marvel Characters, Inc. v. 
Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that 
“synthesiz[ing] dense or voluminous historical texts” and 
offering “context that illuminates or places in perspective past 
events” are proper uses of historical expertise). Unlike in 
Mejia, where an expert’s testimony was found inadmissible 
because he merely summarized law enforcement’s 
straightforward investigation against the defendant as a 
shortcut to proving the elements of the crime without 
synthesis, see Mejia, 545 F.3d at 190–91, 194–98, Tripp’s 
testimony synthesized disparate and voluminous historical 
sources and provided the jury his opinion on the fate of the 
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1933 Double Eagles. There was no error in allowing Tripp to 
testify in this manner. 
Next, we consider the Langbords’ related argument 
that Tripp’s testimony contained inadmissible hearsay that 
should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 
703. That Rule provides that an expert may base his opinion 
on otherwise inadmissible evidence so long as other “experts 
in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of 
facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” This 
inadmissible information may be disclosed to the jury only if 
its “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion 
substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.”  Fed. R. Evid. 
703. As provided by the Committee Notes to the 2000 
amendments to Rule 703, courts need not engage in this latter 
balancing inquiry if the facts or data at issue are “admissible 
for any other purpose” aside from “assist[ing] the jury to 
evaluate the expert’s opinion.” 
On this point, most of the Langbords’ arguments 
evaporate in light of our preceding analysis. As we have 
already discussed, the first-level hearsay found in the Secret 
Service reports, the Barnard opinion, and information related 
to Switt’s prior forfeiture are all admissible. Because they are 
admissible for a purpose other than “assist[ing] the jury to 
evaluate” Tripp’s opinion, we need not engage in the Rule 
703 balancing inquiry and Tripp was free to convey the 
information to the jury. 
Nevertheless, one portion of the Langbords’ argument 
survives—the challenge to Tripp’s invocation of the 
embedded hearsay contained in the Secret Service reports that 
we previously held inadmissible. And we agree with the 
Langbords that this testimony’s probative value did not 
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substantially outweigh its prejudicial impact. While 
probative, the testimony was cumulative because it recounted 
interviews and reports that were later compiled into a final 
report that contained their most important information in 
admissible form—i.e. that the coins were stolen from the 
Mint and landed in Switt’s possession. At the same time, this 
testimony posed additional prejudice to the Langbords 
because it included speculation and characterization of events 
by out-of-court declarants that was adverse to the Langbords’ 
position. For this reason, we find that it was an abuse of 
discretion to permit Tripp to testify to the embedded hearsay 
within the Secret Service reports. 
5 
 While we have found evidentiary errors regarding 
portions of the Secret Service reports and portions of Tripp’s 
testimony about them, a new trial is appropriate only when “a 
substantial right of the party is affected.” Becker v. ARCO 
Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Glass 
v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also 
Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). We find such an error harmless when 
there is a “high probability” that the discretionary error did 
not contribute to the verdict. McQueeny v. Wilmington Trust 
Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924–25 (3d Cir. 1985). Our review of the 
entire record leads us to conclude that the Government was 
able to clearly and convincingly prove the elements of its case 
without reliance on the tainted evidence. Accordingly, for the 
reasons we shall explain, we conclude that the evidentiary 
errors were harmless. 
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a 
 To prevail on its forfeiture action, the Government 
needed to prove the Double Eagles “constitue[d] or [were] 
derived from the proceeds traceable to . . . any offense 
constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in [18 
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)]),” 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). “Specified 
unlawful activity” under § 1956(c)(7) includes stealing or 
embezzling “a thing of value of the United States” or 
receiving, concealing, or retaining such an item with the 
intent to convert it to one’s own use while knowing it was the 
product of theft or embezzlement. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(c)(7)(D); id. § 641; Morissette v. United States, 342 
U.S. 246, 263, 279 (1952). Thus, the Government had to 
prove that: (1) the Double Eagles were things of value; (2) 
they were stolen or embezzled; and (3) whoever stole or 
embezzled the coins knew he was doing so or whoever 
received, concealed, or retained the coins knew that they were 
stolen or embezzled and nonetheless intended to use them for 
personal gain. Only the second and third elements are 
disputed and the Government’s admissible evidence in this 
case clearly established both. 
b 
 The evidence at trial demonstrated overwhelmingly 
that no 1933 Double Eagle ever left the Mint through 
authorized channels and any that did were either stolen or 
embezzled. Within 24 hours of his inauguration on March 4, 
1933, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation that banned 
the payout of gold coin from banks and the Treasury. On 
March 9, Congress codified this presidential order. Not until 
six days later, on March 15, 1933, did the first 1933 Double 
Eagles arrive at the Cashier’s office of the Philadelphia 
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Mint—the office that serves as the “gatekeeper,” taking 
newly minted coins and releasing them to the public. A few 
weeks later, on April 5, 1933, President Roosevelt issued 
another proclamation ordering that all gold in private hands 
be returned to the Government.13 And on January 30, 1934, 
Congress passed the Gold Reserve Act which stated that all 
gold was to be nationalized and the Government’s holdings 
were to be melted into gold bars. 
 The aforementioned legal framework dictated that no 
1933 Double Eagles could lawfully be issued to the public. 
The coins arrived at the Cashier’s office after Congress had 
forbidden the payout of gold. And any coins that left the Mint 
were required to have been returned under the direction of 
President Roosevelt’s April 5 proclamation. The next year, by 
January 30, 1934, all the coins were ordered to be melted.  
 The Langbords nonetheless contend that 1933 Double 
Eagles may have left the Mint because of miscommunication 
or mistake. In particular, they point to a window of time 
between March 7 and April 12, 1933, during which the coins 
may have left the Mint via innocent means. On March 7, an 
Assistant Treasury Secretary informed the Mint that gold coin 
or bars could be issued in exchange for bullion. This 
information was at odds with President Roosevelt’s inaugural 
                                                 
 13 This proclamation contained an exception that 
allowed collectors to retain coins of rare or unusual interest. 
This exception would not have applied to the 1933 Double 
Eagles when the proclamation was issued, however, because 
the fact that the coins were being struck by the hundreds of 
thousands made the 1933 Double Eagles neither rare nor 
unusual—a fact on which both the Government’s and 
Langbords’ experts agreed.  
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proclamation and Congress’s March 9 codification of that 
proclamation. And the Mint was not instructed in a letter from 
the Treasury to halt gold exchanges until April 12, 1933. The 
parties (and their experts) therefore dispute whether gold 
intended for private use could have left the Mint during this 
time. But regardless of whether this window actually existed, 
the Mint’s own records from the relevant years show that no 
1933 Double Eagle ever left the Mint through authorized 
channels. 
 The Mint’s records track the movement of each 1933 
Double Eagle. These records were remarkably detailed, going 
so far as to show the payment of three pennies and their year 
of minting in one transaction. The records indicate that 
445,500 Double Eagles were struck. Five hundred of those 
were sent to the Cashier, while the remaining 445,000 were 
sealed in a basement vault. Of the 500 held in the Cashier’s 
office, 29 were destroyed in tests to determine the coins’ 
purity and weight, 2 were sent to the Smithsonian, and the 
remaining 469 were placed in the basement vault. Then, in 
accordance with the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, the 445,469 
coins left in the vault were ordered melted into gold bars. By 
this accounting, it is clear that not a single 1933 Double Eagle 
was ever authorized to be issued to the public—a fact to 
which both a 1933 Double Eagle historian and a forensic 
accountant testified.  
 The Langbords try mightily to discredit these records, 
but fail to do so in a meaningful way. They claim the records 
are not reliable for three reasons. First, they argue that Mint 
employees “disregarded regulations governing quality control 
and bookkeeping audits,” Langbord Br. 14, as evidenced by 
the fact that the Cashier failed to properly select coins for the 
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assay process,14 and that the Mint’s holdings and records may 
not have been audited as frequently as regulations required. 
Neither of these concerns raises serious reliability 
questions—selecting the right coin for the assay process has 
little to do with the number of coins held by the Mint and the 
absence of a timely audit of the Mint’s holdings does not 
indicate that the records actually contain errors. 
 Second, the Langbords note the fact that Mint records 
show the release of only four 1933 Eagles (not Double 
Eagles) while more than that are privately held today. 
Without more, this fact does little to discredit the records. 
These alleged errors do not involve 1933 Double Eagles and 
the lost 1933 Eagles may not have been logged in the Mint 
records because they too may have left the Mint illegally. 
 And finally, the Langbords argue that the records fail 
to show the release of gold coins on certain dates when other 
documents show that disbursements did in fact occur. As the 
Government explained at trial, however, this argument is 
factually incorrect because the documents to which the 
Langbords refer show only that individuals asked for gold 
coin in return for deposits of gold bullion, not that gold coin 
was actually paid out.15 Mint regulations corroborate the 
                                                 
14 An “assay” is a scientific process used by the Mint 
to test the purity of the gold contained in a given coin. The 
process results in the destruction of the tested coin.  
15 The Langbords also offer the possibility that 1933 
Double Eagles mistakenly left the Mint through “unclassified 
counter cash” which was not broken down by denomination. 
In support of this argument, the Langbords cite a statement 
made by David Tripp in a deposition in which he indicated 
that gold coins may have been part of this counter cash. At 
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Government’s theory by stating that gold would be paid out 
only if requested and available—otherwise, requests would be 
fulfilled by check.  
 Beyond the Mint records, the Government introduced 
evidence to show that the coins were either stolen or 
embezzled. In particular, the Government pointed to a Secret 
Service report regarding its investigation following the 
appearance of 1933 Double Eagles after all the coins should 
have been destroyed. The report’s final conclusion stated that, 
in the opinion of the Secret Service, none of the 1933 Double 
Eagles that had surfaced ever left the Mint through authorized 
channels. Thus, the Secret Service report and the Mint records 
reflect the same conclusion that the 1933 Double Eagles had 
left the Mint illegally.16 
                                                                                                             
trial, however, Tripp stated that additional research led him to 
the conclusion that gold coins were in fact not part of the 
counter cash and that 1933 Double Eagles could not have left 
the Mint via that manner. While the Langbords dispute this 
point, the fact of the matter remains that the Mint records 
account for every 1933 Double Eagle and do not show that 
any one of them left the Mint through authorized channels. 
16 The relevant portion of the Secret Service’s final 
report does not contain multiple hearsay. See App. 5025 
(“The matter having been discussed [with Mint officials] . . . 
the opinion prevails that all of the [1933 Double Eagles] 
known to be in unauthorized circulation are the property of 
the Government.”). Rather, it recounts the conclusion of the 
Secret Service investigators, which is first-level hearsay 
admissible under the ancient documents rule. 
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 In sum, considering the record as a whole, we have no 
doubt that any evidentiary errors were harmless as they relate 
to the jury finding that the coins were either stolen or 
embezzled from the Mint. 
c 
 Next, the Government was required to show that 
whoever stole or embezzled the coins knew he was doing so 
or whoever received, concealed, or retained the coins, knew 
that the coins were stolen or embezzled and nonetheless 
intended to use them for his own gain. In light of the passage 
of so many decades, it is unsurprising that direct evidence of 
intent is lacking in this case. Such evidence is not required, 
however, because “a jury may draw inferences of subjective 
intent from evidence of . . . objective acts, and from 
circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Piekarsky, 687 
F.3d 134, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, there is overwhelming 
circumstantial evidence in support of the Government’s case. 
 For starters, we recall the evidence which shows that 
no 1933 Double Eagle ever left the Mint through authorized 
channels. And if the Mint never meant to issue the coins, its 
records show they were never issued, and the Secret Service 
concluded none were authorized to leave the Mint, it follows 
that the illicit taking and retention of the coins is the only 
plausible explanation for how ten 1933 Double Eagles ended 
up in the safe-deposit box of Israel Switt’s heirs.  
 The Government’s evidence did not stop there. 
Turning back to the reports from the Secret Service’s 
investigation of 1933 Double Eagles that surfaced in the 
1940s, the Government showed that Israel Switt was 
interviewed by Secret Service agents to determine his 
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connection to the coins that had left the Mint. That 
investigation led the Secret Service to conclude that all of the 
Double Eagles that made it into private hands were connected 
to Switt. The fact that Switt had been involved in the 
dissemination of 1933 Double Eagles and that he had been 
investigated by the Secret Service for doing so provide strong 
evidence that he knew the coins were stolen or embezzled and 
that the Government sought their return. 
 Moreover, the Government pointed to Barnard and 
related documents as providing a reason to think Switt knew 
the Double Eagles were stolen or embezzled. Those 
documents—the publication of the opinion in 1947, a news 
report covering the case in the New York Times, and an article 
in The Numismatist about the matter—all make it more likely 
that Switt would have been aware of the controversy 
surrounding the legality of holding 1933 Double Eagles.  
 Finally, yet another body of evidence points to Switt 
knowing the coins were stolen or embezzled: the documents 
demonstrating that the Government forfeited 98 gold coins 
Switt possessed in contravention of the Gold Reserve Act of 
1934. This forfeiture showed that Switt had knowledge that 
holding gold coins was impermissible and could result in 
adverse government action. It also evidences Switt’s motive 
to conceal the coins. 
 Taking all of this evidence together, the Government 
showed that Switt knew that the 1933 Double Eagles were 
embezzled or stolen and that it was illegal to possess them. 
Yet they were stored in a safe-deposit box for decades until 
his daughter disclosed their whereabouts soon after the 
Fenton-Farouk coin was auctioned for $7,590,020. These 
circumstances are more than sufficient to find a violation of 
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18 U.S.C. § 641 and renders the District Court’s evidentiary 
errors harmless. 
D 
The Langbords’ last line of attack on the District 
Court’s judgment is that the Court erroneously instructed the 
jury on two elements of the Government’s forfeiture case. 
First, they claim the District Court improperly instructed the 
jury on the mens rea necessary to establish liability under 18 
U.S.C. § 641. Second, they argue that the District Court 
should have required the jury to find a violation of § 641 
occurring after 1948, the year of the statute’s enactment.17 
1 
In Morissette, the Supreme Court held that, in the 
absence of an express intent requirement in § 641, Congress 
“borrow[ed] terms of art in which are accumulated the legal 
tradition and meaning of centuries of practice,” and that a 
conviction under the statute requires a jury to find “the 
criminal intent . . . wrongfully to deprive another of 
possession of property.” 342 U.S. at 263, 276 (emphasis 
added); see also, e.g., United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 
                                                 
17 We review the District Court’s refusal to give a 
requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion. See United 
States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 352 (3d Cir. 2011). “Where 
a party properly objects to a jury instruction under [Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure] 51, we exercise plenary review to 
determine whether the instruction misstated the applicable 
law.” Collins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652, 655 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
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1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that the “essential part of 
the common law larceny-type offense” was that “the thief . . . 
knew [that the property he took] did not belong to him” 
(quoting United States v. Howey, 427 F.3d 1017, 1017–18 
(9th Cir. 1970)); United States v. Caverly, 408 F.2d 1313, 
1320 n.5 (3d Cir. 1969).  
 The District Court’s instructions conveyed exactly this 
point of law. The Court instructed the jury that it was required 
to find that “whoever stole or embezzled [the 1933 Double 
Eagles] did so knowingly,” and that “to steal means to take 
somebody else’s property without permission with the 
intention of permanently keeping it.” App. 2702 (emphasis 
added) (also defining embezzlement as “to knowingly and 
intentionally take somebody else’s property with the intent to 
permanently keep it by virtue of your employment or your 
position of trust”).  
The Langbords nevertheless contend that the District 
Court misstated the law when it further elaborated that 
“knowingly means that you’re conscious and aware of what 
you’re doing. Right? It means that you’re exercising a choice, 
a deliberate choice. It’s not an accident. It’s not a mistake.” 
App. 2702. We disagree.  
As an initial matter, the District Court’s definition of 
“knowingly” accords with our model instruction. See Third 
Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 5.02 (revised Apr. 
2015) (“knowingly” means that the defendant was “conscious 
and aware of the nature of [his or her] actions and of the 
surrounding facts and circumstances, as specified in the 
definition of the offense(s) charged” (emphasis added)). And 
in conjunction with the District Court’s definition of “steal,” 
the jury was required to find that whoever took the coins was 
 55 
 
“conscious and aware” that they were “somebody else’s 
property.” App. 2702 (also stating that the jury was required 
to find “improper” or “guilty knowledge”). Of course, taken 
in isolation, the definition of knowingly—because it does not 
specify what knowledge is required—could simply require 
mere intentionality of the kind rejected in Morissette. But we 
do not review jury instructions in isolation as the Langbords 
tacitly propose. See, e.g., Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n, AFL–CIO, 949 F.2d 1241, 1258–59 n.15 
(3d Cir. 1991) (“When interpreting jury instructions, the 
reviewing court considers the totality of the instructions and 
not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.”).18 The 
                                                 
18 The Langbords also insist the District Court erred by 
refusing to instruct the jury that a violation of § 641 had to be 
“willful.” A linguistic “chameleon,” see, e.g., United States v. 
Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Bryan v. 
United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 & n.12 (1998)), the word 
“willful” is not found in the statute. It is therefore 
unsurprising that a number of our sister circuits have declined 
to promulgate model instructions that include a willfulness 
charge. See Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, District 
Judges Association, Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions 
(Criminal Cases) 180–82 (2015) (Instruction No. 2.27); 
Committee on Federal Criminal Jury Instructions of the 
Seventh Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the 
Seventh Circuit 196–98 (2012); Judicial Committee on Model 
Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit, Manual of Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of Eighth 
Circuit 221–22 § 6.18.641 (2014) (revised Aug. 5, 2014); 
Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions Committee, Manual of Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions 178–79 (2010) (Instruction Nos. 
8.39 and 8.40); Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee 
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District Court properly instructed the jury on the mens rea 
required by § 641. 
2 
The Langbords’ last objection concerns the District 
Court’s instruction that a theft under § 641 rendering the 1933 
Double Eagles subject to forfeiture could have occurred 
“some time in the past.” App. 2702. The Langbords claim that 
the jury should have been instructed that it was required to 
find a theft occurring after 1948, the year Congress enacted 
the statute. This contention betrays a misunderstanding of the 
                                                                                                             
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 119–20 (2011) (revised 
Sept. 10, 2015); see also Committee on Pattern Jury 
Instructions of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) 36, 177–79 (2010) 
(dividing willfulness offenses into those with an ordinary 
general intent requirement, and “highly technical [offenses] 
that present the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in 
apparently innocent conduct”). 
The District Court accordingly did not abuse its 
discretion in declining to give the Langbords’ requested 
charge to the jury. See United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 
1362 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[N]o particular verbal formula or 
talismanic combination of words is required to properly 
allege the element of specific intent . . . under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 641.”). We also note that the Langbords’ proposed 
definition of willfulness—requiring knowledge of 
unlawfulness—does not differ meaningfully from the “guilty 
knowledge” that the District Court required the jury to find. 
See App. 2702. 
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interplay between 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 1956(c)(7), and the 
retroactive application of civil statutes. 
In addition to reforming several procedural aspects of 
civil asset forfeiture, CAFRA vastly expanded the scope of 
property subject to forfeiture by amending 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(a)(1)(C)—the statute authorizing forfeiture in this 
case—to include “any offense constituting ‘specified 
unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7)).” See Pub 
L. No. 106-185, § 20, 114 Stat. 202, 224 (2000); United 
States v. All Funds Distributed to Weiss, 345 F.3d 49, 52–53 
& n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that prior to CAFRA’s 
inclusion of “specified unlawful activity” in § 981(a)(1)(C), 
the Government could seek forfeiture only through a violation 
of the money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 
and 1960, listed in § 981(a)(1)(A)). Then, as now, § 
1956(c)(7) provided that “[t]he term ‘specified unlawful 
activity’ means . . . an offense under . . .  section 641 (relating 
to public money, property, or records).”  
The question thus arises whether CAFRA’s 
amendment to § 981(a)(1)(C) permits the Government to 
pursue the forfeiture of property previously not “subject to 
forfeiture” but made so by the Act. In United States v. One 
“Piper” Aztec, 321 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2003), we addressed a 
related question with respect to CAFRA’s imposition of the 
burden of proof on the Government to prove forfeiture under 
18 U.S.C. § 983(c). In that case, our analysis under Landgraf 
v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994), was not 
particularly difficult because Congress “clear[ly] and 
unambiguous[ly]” set forth the enactment’s temporal scope 
by providing a retroactivity clause. 321 F.3d at 358 & n.3. 
Specifically, Congress stated that “[CAFRA] and the 
amendments by [CAFRA] shall apply to any forfeiture 
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proceeding commenced on or after [August 23, 2000].” Pub. 
L. No. 106-185, § 21, 114 Stat. 202, 225 (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 
1324 (note). We therefore held that the Government’s 
heightened burden applies only in civil forfeitures 
“commenced on or after [August, 23, 2000].” 321 F.3d at 
357–58.  
So too here. As illustrated by One “Piper” Aztec, 
CAFRA’s retroactivity clause is the beginning and end of the 
Landgraf analysis in this case because only one date is 
relevant to CAFRA’s applicability: August 23, 2000.19 See 
                                                 
19 CAFRA’s retroactivity clause is also why the 
Langbords’ focus on § 641’s year of enactment is inapposite. 
In passing CAFRA, Congress was aware that entire swaths of 
new property would become subject to forfeiture due to 
conduct occurring prior to CAFRA’s effective date, pursuant 
to various criminal statutes that were themselves enacted 
“some time in the past.” Nonetheless, the legislature did not 
single out any these myriad dates of enactment, and instead 
tied CAFRA’s application only to the date of its own 
enactment.  
 We are also unpersuaded by the Langbords’ reliance 
on United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. 
Pa. 1993). At issue in that case was a version of 18 U.S.C. § 
981(a)(1)(A) that rendered forfeitable “[a]ny property, real or 
personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in 
violation . . . of section 1956 or 1957 of [title 18], or any 
property traceable to such property.” 836 F. Supp. at 1151. 
Sections 1956 and 1957 are money laundering statutes that 
were enacted in the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1352, 1366, 110 Stat. 3207-18, 3207-
35. That statute, unlike CAFRA, did not include a provision 
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321 F.3d at 357–58. For this reason, we hold that CAFRA’s 
amendment to § 981(a)(1)(C) applies to property made 
forfeitable by conduct occurring prior to the Act. 
Accordingly, for predicate offenses already listed in § 
1956(c)(7) at the time CAFRA was passed—such as § 641—
we need only look to whether the Government filed its 
                                                                                                             
specifying an effective date, much less a retroactivity clause. 
836 F. Supp. at 1156 & n.11; see also Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 
1364, 110 Stat. 3207-34–35. Furthermore, § 981(a)(1)(A) 
required (and still requires) a “violation” of either § 1956 or 
§ 1957. Thus, the court in Eleven Vehicles determined the 
statutes’ effective date to be the date of their enactment, 
October 27, 1986, and declined to permit retroactive 
forfeitures thereunder. In contrast, CAFRA not only includes 
a retroactivity clause, but is broadly phrased to permit the 
forfeiture of “proceeds traceable to . . . any offense 
constituting ‘specified unlawful activity,’” which includes “an 
offense under . . . section 641.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C), 
1956(c)(7)(D) (emphasis added). 
Finally, to the extent that the Langbords’ retroactivity 
argument suggests that the Government’s forfeiture action 
depends on actions that were not criminal at the time they 
were taken, we disagree with their factual premise. As 
Morissette makes clear, although § 641 was enacted in 1948, 
the statute had “no other purpose . . . than to collect from 
scattered sources crimes so kindred as to belong in one 
category.” 342 U.S. at 266–67. Thus, the fact that § 641 did 
not exist until 1948 does not mean that “embezzl[ing], 
steal[ing], or purloin[ing] . . . property of the United States” 
was lawful activity prior to that date. Id. at 266 n.28. 
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forfeiture complaint on or after August 23, 2000. Id. With 
respect to the ten 1933 Double Eagles at issue in this case, the 
Government filed its forfeiture complaint in 2009. App. 
1162–82. Thus, “our inquiry is done.” One “Piper” Aztec, 
321 F.3d at 358. The District Court’s jury instructions were 
proper. 
* * * 
This case is unique for many reasons. It involves 
iconic American gold pieces that apparently had lain dormant 
in a safe-deposit box for decades. Almost immediately after 
the 1933 Double Eagles surfaced in 2002, the right to possess 
and own them was vigorously disputed. The resolution of that 
dispute required the District Court to consider novel questions 
of constitutional, statutory, and common law. The able trial 
judge worked diligently through all of the issues and gave 
both sides a fair trial. Once the jury had spoken, the District 
Court declared that the 1933 Double Eagles had always been 
property of the United States. Although the benefit of 
hindsight has convinced us that certain errors were committed 
in the conduct of the trial, they did not affect the outcome. 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
1 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment: 
_________________________________ 
 
 I agree with the excellent opinion of the Majority in all 
but one respect.  Like Judge Rendell and those joining her 
partial dissent, I cannot join Part IV.A of the Majority 
Opinion.  I have serious doubts about the Majority’s assertion 
that there was no nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding here and, 
hence, I also question the conclusion that CAFRA does not 
apply.  Nothing in CAFRA or, to my knowledge, elsewhere in 
the United States Code specifies how a “nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding” actually begins.  Although the government 
asserts, and the Majority agrees, that there were no such 
proceedings here, the language of CAFRA suggests 
otherwise. 
 
 Of particular note is 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iii).  
Under that section, when the government obtains a criminal 
indictment with an allegation that the property is subject to 
forfeiture before the 60-day period for notice has expired,1 it 
has two choices concerning its notice obligation: (1) “send 
                                              
 1 As the Majority lays out, see Majority Op. at 14, 
CAFRA provides that the government generally has 60 days 
from the date of seizure to send to interested parties written 
notice of the seizure and its intent to forfeit the property, at 
which point a claimant may file a seized asset claim.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A); 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a).  If a seized asset 
claim is filed, the nonjudicial forfeiture cannot proceed, and 
the government then has 90 days to file a complaint for 
judicial forfeiture or to return the property pending the filing 
of a complaint.  18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A). 
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notice within the 60 days and continue the nonjudicial civil 
forfeiture proceeding under this section”; or (2) “terminate 
the nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding” and use the 
criminal forfeiture laws.  18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(iii) 
(emphasis added).  Both verbs – “continue” and “terminate” – 
presuppose that a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding has 
already begun, even though no “notice” designated as such 
may have been provided.  In addition, § 983(e)(1) provides 
that “[a]ny person entitled to written notice in any nonjudicial 
civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who 
does not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a 
declaration of forfeiture with respect to that person’s interest 
in the property … .”  That section similarly assumes the 
existence of a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding, even though 
the government has not yet sent something designated as a 
“notice” to verify its intent to pursue forfeiture. 
 
 That is not to say that no notice is necessary.  Some 
manifestation of the intent to keep the seized property is 
needed.  The Code of Federal Regulations provides that an 
“administrative forfeiture proceeding”2 commences, as 
relevant here, “when the first personal written notice” of the 
seizure is sent to interested parties.  28 C.F.R. § 8.8.  The 
Majority makes the footnoted assertion, at the government’s 
urging, that, “although CAFRA does not specify the content 
of nonjudicial forfeiture notices, a letter that explicitly 
disavows any intent to initiate a forfeiture surely cannot 
                                              
 2 The regulations define an “administrative forfeiture” 
as “the process by which property may be forfeited by a 
seizing agency rather than through a judicial proceeding,” and 
provide that the term “nonjudicial forfeiture” as used in § 983 
bears the same meaning.  28 C.F.R. §§ 8.2, 9.2. 
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suffice.”  (Majority Op. at 17 n.5.)  I disagree.  In my view, 
the simple omission of the word “forfeiture” from the 
government’s notice – when that notice did in fact assert the 
functional equivalent of a forfeiture – does not avoid the 
deadlines and protections of CAFRA.  When (as here) the 
government seizes property, asserts its title, and tells the 
previous owner that it will never return the property, that 
should surely suffice to trigger a “nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding.”3 
 
 It is noteworthy that, in teaching Department of Justice 
attorneys the proper contours of forfeiture policy, the 2016 
Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual 
cautions its attorneys not to use formalistic distinctions to try 
to bypass CAFRA’s statutory deadlines.  That manual 
provides that, even though CAFRA’s 90-day deadline may 
not apply to property subject only to judicial forfeiture, in a 
case involving such seized property, “the prosecutor should 
treat [a seized asset claim] as if it were a ‘claim’ referred to in 
section 983(a)(3)(A) …, and should thus commence a judicial 
forfeiture action within 90 days of the receipt of the request.”  
Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering Section, Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual at 58 
(2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/ 
                                              
 3 Further, the government’s claim that it did not need 
to engage in a forfeiture proceeding because the Double 
Eagles were its own property is a logical box that I, like the 
Majority, will decline to step into.  (See Majority Op. at 13 
n.3.)  That dubious position both assumes the truth of the 
government’s allegation without any requirement of proof 
and gives the government the power to unilaterally define 
when there is and is not a forfeiture. 
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file/839521/download.  The Manual establishes that deadline 
for judicial forfeiture because, 
 
[i]f the Government were to seize property for 
forfeiture in a situation where administrative 
forfeiture was authorized, but then ignore the 
60- and 90-day deadlines in sections 983(a)(1) 
and (3) on the ground that it intended all along 
to skip over the administrative forfeiture 
process and proceed directly with a judicial 
forfeiture, courts might suspect that the 
Government was actually conjuring an ad hoc 
excuse for missing the statutory deadlines, or 
had decided to bypass the administrative 
forfeiture proceeding for the express purpose of 
circumventing the statutory deadlines and the 
underlying congressional intent. 
 
Id. at 57.  That is an insight worth mulling over. 
 
 The Majority’s careful distinction between a “seizure” 
and a “forfeiture” – that the former transfers possession while 
the latter transfers title – is certainly correct.  (Majority Op. at 
18-19.)  But a seizure will often be a component of a 
forfeiture.  And that distinction is of limited utility here, 
because when the government seized the disputed coins it 
simultaneously asserted that it had no intention to seek 
forfeiture since it already had title.  In other words, the 
government took possession and, in doing so, asserted title.  It 
is difficult to square the Majority’s distinction between 
seizure and forfeiture on this record, when the government 
took the coins and said that it had both possession and title.  
Under these circumstances, the government’s claim of 
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ownership and the manifestation of its intent to retain 
indefinite possession of the coins was, in my view, sufficient 
to initiate a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding. 
 
 All of this accords with common sense because, in the 
absence of some clear description of what a notice must 
contain or how a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding starts, the 
reasonable default conclusion is that it begins when the 
government takes your property and refuses to ever give it 
back – in short, when there is a seizure accompanied by some 
manifestation of an intent to claim ownership.  I thus am 
inclined to agree with Judge Rendell that, when CAFRA 
speaks of a “nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding,” it is not 
referencing some formal administrative action with the 
trappings of a quasi-judicial proceeding.  The statute is using 
that phrase as a shorthand recognition that law enforcement 
agencies can and do leave the courts out of the process of 
taking and keeping property when it appears that no one else 
is claiming an interest in the property.  As the Majority itself 
recognizes, “[n]onjudicial forfeitures ... ‘permit[] the United 
States to determine whether property in its custody is 
unclaimed, and, if it is, to take ownership without the trouble 
and expense of court proceedings.’”  (Majority Op. at 15 n.4 
(quoting Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1335 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998)).  I thus do not accept the premise advanced by the 
Majority that, for there to have been a “nonjudicial civil 
forfeiture proceeding” in this case, there needed to be some 
government action beyond the seizure of the Double Eagles 
and the stated intent to retain possession and ownership of 
them.4 
                                              
 4 This case presents the circumstance of the 
government both taking possession and asserting ownership, 
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 The oddity of the government’s decision to initially 
forgo any approach to a court in this case is that it was 
apparent from the outset there were claimants to the property 
in question.  Laying claim to the Double Eagles without going 
to court was thus a bad idea from the start.  Most every 
government agency involved here – the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the District of Columbia, the Secret Service, and 
the Department of the Treasury – seemed to share that view.  
Every agency except one: the Mint.  A nonjudicial approach 
to resolving the dispute over ownership should not have been 
the option chosen by the government, and, indeed, the District 
Court determined that the government’s actions here violated 
the Langbords’ constitutional rights, concluding “that the 
Government’s belief that the coins had been stolen did not 
diminish [the Langbord’s] Fourth Amendment rights and did 
not change the nature of the Government’s seizure.”  (App. 
153.)  That conclusion has not been challenged on appeal and 
it is supported by the record.  The District Court then faced 
the difficult decision of determining how to remedy the 
constitutional violation while giving both the Langbords and 
the government the day in court that should have been sought 
in the first instance.  The Court’s decision requiring the 
government to “promptly initiate a forfeiture action” may or 
may not have been appropriate under the circumstances, but 
the government’s handling of the dispute was clearly ill-
advised.  (App. 157.)  The safe and sensible choice would 
have been to comply with CAFRA. 
                                                                                                     
which makes the outcome all the clearer to me.  But if the 
government had simply said “we’ve got the coins and we’re 
keeping them,” without reference to ownership or title, I do 
not think that would be any less a forfeiture. 
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 That reasoning leads me also to reject the Majority’s 
characterization of the Langbords’ decision to file a seized 
asset claim as being “incongruous[].”  (Majority Op. at 17.)  
A seized asset claim certainly sounds like the right way to 
claim assets that the government has seized, so there was 
nothing incongruous about that step.  Nor am I persuaded by 
the Majority’s assertion that the Langbords’ “seized asset 
claim was akin to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of someone not in custody – mismatched and 
ineffective.”  (Majority Op. at 18.)  To borrow the metaphor, 
it seems to me instead that the situation is more like one in 
which the government is keeping a habeas claimant locked in 
a 6’ by 9’ room while insisting that he is not really in custody.  
Just because the government says a person is not in custody 
does not make it so.  Likewise, the government took custody 
of the Double Eagles and would not return them, so its 
assertion that what was happening was not a forfeiture of 
whatever right the Langbords might have had does not make 
that assertion true.  I would not go as far as Judge Rendell in 
faulting the government for “audacity” (Dissent Op. at 1), but 
I do believe we have allowed ourselves to be caught in a 
semantic game in this case.  Labeled a “forfeiture” or not, 
what matters is what happened: the government took the 
property, claimed ownership, and kept it; the Langbords 
wanted it back.  Resolving disputes like that is what forfeiture 
proceedings are for.  A good argument can be made, and 
Judge Rendell has made it, that Congress meant for CAFRA 
to be the first option that the government and claimants turn 
to when fighting over who gets to keep disputed property. 
 
 But the strict deadlines in CAFRA do not always apply 
and we have reason to question whether they do here.  The 
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reason for doubt is not because the government says, “these 
are ours; you stole them.”  CAFRA specifically contemplates 
property stolen from the government as being subject to 
CAFRA’s regime.  See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (stating that 
property “subject to forfeiture” includes the proceeds of 
“specified unlawful activity” defined in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1956(c)(7), which includes the offense of theft of 
government property under 18 U.S.C. § 641).  The reason that 
the CAFRA deadlines may not apply is, instead, as noted by 
Judge Rendell, that the Double Eagles may be merchandise 
valued at over $500,000, instead of being monetary 
instruments, so they may be statutorily ineligible for 
nonjudicial forfeiture.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); Dissent Op. 
at 8-10. 
 
 No court has yet addressed that question, and it is an 
interesting one, but, unlike the dissenters, I do not see a need 
to remand the case for an answer.  The unusual facts here 
provide an alternative basis for affirming the judgment of the 
District Court.  As the Majority notes, the government 
pursued a proper declaratory judgment action to quiet title to 
the Double Eagles “in addition to the court-ordered judicial 
forfeiture proceeding.”  (Majority Op. at 24 (original 
emphasis).)  The government did so under a legal theory 
independent of its forfeiture claim, “namely, that the 
Government was attempting to regain possession of what it 
believed to be its own property.”  (Id.)  Because, in these 
particular circumstances, the District Court was within its 
discretion in allowing the government to file a declaratory 
judgment action in addition to (and not in lieu of) the judicial 
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forfeiture proceeding,5 there is no need for us to assess the 
propriety of the forfeiture action itself.  Even if the 
government violated CAFRA, the fact that the disputed 
property (allegedly) belonged to it all along allowed it to seek 
a separate declaratory judgment in its capacity as the 
property’s purported rightful owner.  Given the unusual 
procedural and factual background of this case, any errors in 
the forfeiture proceeding did not infect the distinct 
declaratory judgment action.  That is all we need to say, and 
judicial restraint counsels that we go no further.  Cf. PDK 
Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary 
not to decide more.”) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). 
 
 In short, because a separate action to quiet title was 
permissible in this unusual context, we need not venture into 
the CAFRA thicket.  I emphasize, however, that my 
agreement that there is an independent and adequate basis on 
which to affirm here should not be taken as an endorsement 
of the government’s ignoring the statutorily provided 
mechanisms for forfeiture.  The approach taken by the Mint is 
one that ought not be repeated. 
 
 I concur in the balance of the Majority’s opinion and 
in its judgment. 
                                              
 5 I fully agree with Part IV.B.3 of the Majority’s 
opinion, which explains why “the District Court committed 
no error when it allowed the Government to amend its 
counterclaim” to add the declaratory judgment claim.  
(Majority Op. at 29.) 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting with whom McKEE, 
Chief Judge and KRAUSE Circuit Judge join: 
 
 I respectfully dissent from Part IV.A of the majority’s 
opinion. The majority’s reasoning as to why CAFRA’s 
nonjudicial forfeiture provisions do not apply here is at best 
cryptic and, at worst, sets an incorrect and dangerous 
precedent that would allow the Government to nullify 
CAFRA’s provisions at will. In effect, the majority holds that 
the Government did not commence a nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding, and thus avoided the dictates of CAFRA, based 
mainly on its buy-in to the Government’s audacity—the 
Government’s say-so that it owned the 1933 Double Eagles 
and had no intention of forfeiting them. But in reaching this 
unprecedented result, the majority not only disregards how 
CAFRA works and what actually happened here, but also 
renders CAFRA’s protections largely meaningless and defies 
Congress’s intent in passing the statute.    
    
I. 
 This case involves precisely the type of situation that 
CAFRA was enacted to prevent: the Government’s seizing 
and taking ownership of property in derogation of the rights 
of ordinary citizens. Indeed, Congress passed CAFRA to 
“level[] the playing field between the government and 
persons whose property has been seized.” United States v. 
Real Prop. in Section 9, 241 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 2001). 
To that end, CAFRA imposes deadlines on the Government 
for commencing a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding of seized 
property and for filing a judicial forfeiture action in response 
to a citizen’s timely claim to that property—not to mention 
deterrent penalties for missing those deadlines.  
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 A nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding under CAFRA is 
not a “proceeding” in the true sense of the word, but, rather, a 
statutory scheme. That scheme is commenced when the 
Government seizes property and notifies all interested parties 
within “60 days . . . of the seizure,” 18 U.S.C. § 
983(a)(1)(A)(i), that it intends to keep the property as its own 
“without the trouble and expense of court proceedings,” Small 
v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998). If no 
one submits a timely claim to the property in response 
(known as a “seized asset claim”), the Government can issue 
a “declaration of forfeiture . . . [that has] the same force and 
effect as a final decree and order of forfeiture in a judicial 
forfeiture proceeding in a district court of the United States.” 
19 U.S.C. § 1609(b). But if someone asserts a timely seized 
asset claim, the nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding ceases, and 
the Government has 90 days to file a judicial forfeiture action, 
18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A), in which it then bears the burden of 
proving its right to the property, id. § 983(c)(1). If the 
Government does not file a timely action, though, it must 
“promptly release the property . . . and may not take any 
further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such property in 
connection with the underlying offense.” Id. § 983(a)(3)(B).1  
                                              
 
1 The cases cited by the majority, though not decided 
under CAFRA, confirm that the nonjudicial forfeiture scheme 
generally operates this way. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 
483 F.3d 385, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Miscellaneous Firearms, 376 F.3d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 765–66 (6th Cir. 
2000); Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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 The majority ignores how CAFRA’s scheme applies 
here—notwithstanding that the events fit within it in lockstep. 
The Government seized the 1933 Double Eagles when it 
failed to honor the Langbords’ July 25, 2005, letter requesting 
their return and instead “decided to keep [them] for [its] own 
purposes.” Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 645 F. Supp. 
2d 381, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Next, on August 9, 2005, within 
60 days of seizing the 1933 Double Eagles, see 18 U.S.C. § 
983(a)(1)(A)(i), the Government sent a letter to the 
Langbords notifying them that it intended to keep these 
items—without a court proceeding—because they allegedly 
“already are, and always have been, property belonging to the 
United States.” App. 823.2 To be sure, in this letter the 
Government disclaimed any intent to forfeit the 1933 Double 
Eagles. See id. But this statement alone cannot preclude the 
letter from constituting notice of the Government’s intent to 
nonjudically forfeit them. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) 
(requiring only that “notice shall be sent in a manner to 
achieve proper notice”); Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture 
Law in the United States 173 (2d ed. 2013) (“Section 
983(a)(1)(A)(i) is silent as to the content of the notice.”). And 
                                              
 2 It is indisputable that allegedly stolen Government 
property is subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 
(property is subject to forfeiture if it “constitutes or is derived 
from proceeds traceable to . . . any offense constituting 
‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) 
of this title)”); id. § 1956(c)(7)(D) (“[S]pecified unlawful 
activity” includes “an offense under . . . section 641 (relating 
to public money, property, or records)”); id. § 641 
(criminalizing the theft or embezzlement of any “thing of 
value of the United States or of any department or agency 
thereof”). 
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in response to this notice, the Langbords filed a timely claim, 
terminating the nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding and 
triggering the Government’s obligation to file a judicial 
forfeiture action within 90 days and prove its right to the 1933 
Double Eagles. But it did not.3 
 
 The majority concludes that the Langbords failed to 
trigger the 90-day deadline with their seized asset claim 
because the Government chose not to initiate forfeiture 
proceedings against the 1933 Double Eagles. It reasons that 
“the Government determined that it was not obliged to initiate 
forfeiture proceedings against the 1933 Double Eagles 
because it had merely repossessed its own property” and “[i]n 
                                              
 3 Consider what would have happened if the 
Langbords had not filed a timely seized asset claim but had 
filed a replevin action a few months after the Government’s 
notice. Despite the Mint’s stated position that it was not 
seeking forfeiture, is there any doubt that it would have 
argued that the Langbords were barred under CAFRA from 
claiming the 1933 Double Eagles because they had been 
nonjudicially forfeited due to the Langbords’ failure to file a 
timely seized asset claim? The Government cannot have it 
both ways.   
 Indeed, I suggest that the Mint’s statement that it did 
not intend to pursue forfeiture proceedings meant that it did 
not intend to file an unprompted judicial forfeiture complaint. 
Every agency involved in this saga other than the Mint 
advised the Mint that it should bring a judicial forfeiture 
action from the outset. See App. 818. Yet the Mint decided 
not to do so and instead commenced a nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding by notifying the Langbords that it intended to 
keep the 1933 Double Eagles without any court proceeding.   
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fact . . . explicitly disclaimed any intent to forfeit the[m].” 
Majority Op. 16. Instead, the majority notes, “the 
Government asserted its ownership rights to the coins.” Id. 
17. It thus holds that the Government never took any steps to 
commence a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding against the 
1933 Double Eagles, and so the Langbords’ seized asset 
claim was “mismatched” and “ineffective,” likening it to the 
filing of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of someone not in 
custody. Id. 18.4  
 
 But that approach enables the Government to nullify 
all of CAFRA’s protections merely by asserting its ownership 
of property and lack of intent to forfeit that property.   
Congress cannot have intended this result. See Civil Asset 
Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 
Stat. 202 pmbl. (CAFRA’s purpose is “[t]o provide a more 
just and uniform procedure for Federal civil forfeitures”); 
United States v. Khan, 497 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Congress passed CAFRA “to deter government 
overreaching”); United States v. Martin, 460 F. Supp. 2d 669, 
672 (D. Md. 2006) (“CAFRA was enacted in 2000 to curb 
what Congress perceived as abuses of the existing civil 
forfeiture system.”). Rather, to stay true to Congress’s intent, 
we must focus on what actually occurred here: the 
Government seized property that is, by statute, subject to 
                                              
 4 The majority’s second line of reasoning relies on two 
cases, Mantilla v. United States, 302 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2002), 
and United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). These non-CAFRA cases support the 
unremarkable proposition that a seizure does not necessarily 
commence a forfeiture proceeding, and they do not determine 
the outcome of this case. 
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forfeiture, see supra note 2, with the intent to keep that 
property permanently and without a court proceeding, and so 
notified the Langbords. Clearly, then, a nonjudicial forfeiture 
proceeding was in process before the Langbords filed their 
seized asset claim, which should have triggered the filing of a 
judicial forfeiture complaint by the Government within 90 
days, see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A).5     
 Accordingly, because the Government’s failure to file 
a judicial forfeiture action within 90 days of the Langbords’ 
                                              
 5 The Government’s claim that the 1933 Double 
Eagles belong to the United States, after all, is just that, and 
the validity of that claim is the very question to be answered 
by a forfeiture proceeding, not by the Government’s say-so. 
That CAFRA expressly provides for an “innocent owner 
defense,” see 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (providing that “[a]n 
innocent owner’s interest in property shall not be forfeited 
under any civil forfeiture statute”), drives home that where 
there is any colorable claim of a legitimate property interest 
by the claimant-possessor, the validity of the asserted interest 
needs to be determined through a forfeiture proceeding. 
Allowing the Government’s self-declaration of its own 
property interest to be conclusive puts the forfeiture cart 
before the horse. Were it otherwise, the Government might 
well assert that its pre-existing title to seized property enables 
it to avoid CAFRA in any number of situations. See, e.g., id. 
§ 981(f) (“All right, title, and interest in property described in 
subsection (a) of this section [i.e., forfeitable property] shall 
vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving 
rise to forfeiture under this section.”); but cf. United States v. 
92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 124–29 (1993) (plurality 
opinion) (explaining that an identical provision in 21 U.S.C. § 
881(h) does not confer title until forfeiture has been decreed).  
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timely seized asset claim barred it as a matter of law from 
taking any further action to forfeit the 1933 Double Eagles, 
see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B), the District Court erred in 
permitting the Government to later file its declaratory 
judgment and judicial forfeiture actions.6 Instead, the District 
Court should have ordered the 1933 Double Eagles returned 
to the Langbords pursuant to the statutory directive. I would 
therefore reverse the District Court’s order. 
                                              
 6 I respectfully disagree with Judge Jordan’s view in 
his concurrence that, even if the Government violated 
CAFRA’s 90-day deadline, it was still permitted to bring its 
declaratory judgment action seeking to quiet title to the 1933 
Double Eagles. He and the majority justify the Government’s 
declaratory judgment action because it was purportedly based 
on a legal theory independent of the forfeiture claim. At 
bottom, though, in both claims, the Government sought to 
quiet title to the 1933 Double Eagles. See United States v. 
McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 275 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he purpose of 
a quiet title action is to determine which named party has 
superior claim to a certain piece of property.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). The forfeiture claim and 
declaratory judgment action were thus “essentially predicated 
upon the same cause of action,” Algrant v. Evergreen Valley 
Nurseries Ltd. P’ship, 126 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 1997), and 
because the Government was not permitted to “take any 
further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such property,” 
18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added), as a matter of 
law it was not allowed to circumvent CAFRA’s 90-day 
deadline “by ‘[d]raping [its] claim in the raiment of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act,’” Algrant, 126 F.3d at 185 
(quoting Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 58 (1st 
Cir. 1991)).              
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II. 
 But we must address another issue as to the 
applicability of CAFRA’s nonjudicial forfeiture provisions 
here. Even though the Government’s seizure and notice 
usually commence the nonjudicial forfeiture scheme, some 
property is ineligible for nonjudicial forfeiture. The 
Government has urged that the 1933 Double Eagles are 
ineligible for nonjudicial forfeiture because they are 
“merchandise” whose value “exceed[s] $500,000” and not 
“monetary instrument[s].” 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a); id. § 1610. If 
that is true, the Langbords’ seized asset claim would have 
been ineffective to trigger the 90-day deadline. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 983(a)(2)(A) (claim can be filed only by a “person claiming 
property seized in a nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding”). 
And, thus, the judicial forfeiture initiated by the Government 
in 2009 would have been timely because § 983(a)(3)(A) did 
not apply.  
 
 This issue should give us pause. The definition of 
“monetary instruments” includes, among other things, 
“United States coins and currency,” “travelers’ checks,” and 
“bearer securities.” 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3). Did Congress 
intend that “monetary instrument” should encompass only 
currency in circulation and liquid assets that constitute 
substitutes for currency? See H.R. Rep. No. 91-975, at 22 
(1970) (discussing a statute requiring domestic financial 
institutions to report certain transactions involving “monetary 
instruments” and stating that “[i]t is not the intention of your 
committee . . . that [monetary instruments] be expanded any 
further than necessary to cover those types of bearer 
instruments which may substitute for currency”). On the other 
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hand, the 1933 Double Eagles are rare, uncirculated coins 
whose seemingly immense value derives from their status as 
collector’s items. Viewed in this way, they would be not 
monetary instruments but, instead, merchandise possibly 
worth over $500,000, which is ineligible for nonjudicial 
forfeiture.  
 
 This is a threshold issue that must be decided—one 
that cuts to the very applicability of CAFRA’s nonjudicial 
forfeiture scheme.7 Nevertheless, although it was presented to 
the District Court, it was never addressed there, let alone 
decided. We should therefore remand to the District Court for 
it to make the initial ruling on this issue.8  
  
 Thus, I urge that CAFRA’s nonjudicial forfeiture 
scheme was set in motion here and would require that the 
1933 Double Eagles be returned to the Langbords under 18 
U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B). But that result should follow only if 
the District Court decides that CAFRA’s nonjudicial 
forfeiture scheme even applied to them. I suggest that remand 
                                              
 7 See, e.g., In re Funds on Deposit, 919 F. Supp. 2d 
169, 174–75 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that CAFRA’s 
nonjudicial forfeiture scheme did not apply because the 
Government seized property that was ineligible for 
nonjudicial forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607(a) and 1610).   
 8 The District Court would decide (1) whether the 1933 
Double Eagles are merchandise or U.S. coins and currency; 
and (2) if merchandise, whether they are in fact worth over 
$500,000. While there is evidence in the record suggesting 
this valuation, it was never an issue that was vetted or decided 
in the District Court.     
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is the appropriate disposition in the first instance and, 
therefore, respectfully dissent.   
